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Abstract
Towards a nuanced view of diagnostic test properties: an
application to transfusion transmitted risk estimation
J. Bingham
Department of Mathematical Sciences,
University of Stellenbosch,
Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
Thesis: MSc (Mathematics)
February 2021
Laboratory screening (rather than pathogen inactivation) is likely to remain,
for the foreseeable future, the primary means of ensuring the safety of blood
products from transfusion transmissible viruses such as Hepatitis B, Hepatitis
C, and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Depending on the tests used,
there is generically some ‘residual risk’ of transfusion transmitted infection, as
no test can guarantee detection of all potentially infectious material. Previously-
described risk estimation approaches 1) mostly treat detectability and infec-
tiousness as categories rather than continuously tunable; 2) disregard sources
of variability and their correlation; and 3) are not generalizable to arbitrary de-
tection biomarkers – making it difficult to generate estimates of residual risk
without extensive programmatic monitoring.
We describe a broad framework for modelling test performance which in-
corporates hitherto neglected sources of variability in parameters governing
the infectiousness and detectability of transfusion-transmissible pathogens. We
utilise models based on this framework to demonstrate the relationship be-
tween test performance and residual risk for various assumptions about the
ii
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biomarker/infectiousness relationship, and illustrate how the same framework
may be used to inform modelling efforts in related fields - such as infection
dating and incidence estimation - which rely on realistic representations of test
performance.
The key findings from our scenario modelling demonstrate: 1) Diminishing
returns on increased screening sensitivity not evident in less flexible models; 2)
increasing inter-subject variability in detectability and infectiousness leads to
increasing residual risk in our general model, but lower risk estimates than in
a previously described and widely used semi-mechanistic model. These effects
are stronger when the average delay between infectiousness and detectability
is short.
Planning blood product screening algorithms in light of simulations using our
models can generate robust expectations of residual risk over a wide range of
test performance and product risk levels. We outline when simpler models may
be relied upon, and when additional nuance must be considered.
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Uittreksel
Stappe tot ’n verfynde begrip van diagnostiese toetseienskappe:
’n toepassing op die beraming van bloedoortapping risiko
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Tesis: MSc (Mathematics)
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Laboratoriumtoetsing (eerder as patogeeninaktivering) sal waarskynlik in die
afsienbare toekoms die primêre manier bly om die veiligheid van bloedpro-
dukte teen oordraagbare virusse soos hepatitis B en C en menslike immuni-
teitsgebreksvirus (MIV) te verseker. Afhangend van die toetse wat gebruikte
word, is daar ’n ’oorblywende risiko’ van infeksie deur oortapping, aange-
sien geen toets die opsporing van alle moontlike aansteeklike materiaal kan
waarborg nie. Voorheen beskryfde risiko-beramingsbenaderings 1) behandel
opspoorbaarheid en aansteeklikheid meestal as kategorieë eerder as kontinue
eienskappe; 2) bronne van variansie en die korrelasie daarvan word verontag-
saam; en 3) kan nie veralgemeen word vir arbitrêre opsporing van biomerkers
nie, wat dit moeilik maak om ramings van oorblywende risiko te genereer son-
der uitgebreide programmatiese waarneming. Ons beskryf ’n breë raamwerk
vir die modellering van die diagnostiese akkuraatheid van toetse. Dit sluit in
iv
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bronne van variansie in die parameters wat die aansteeklikheid en opspoor-
baarheid van oortapping-oordraagbare patogene beheer. Ons gebruik modelle
wat gebaseer is op hierdie raamwerk om die verband tussen toetsprestasie en
oorblywende risiko vir verskillende aannames oor die biomerker / aansteek-
likheidsverhouding aan te toon, en illustreer hoe dieselfde raamwerk gebruik
kan word om modelleringspogings in verwante velde in te lig. Voorbeelde sluit
in die beraming van infeksie datums en die beraming van infeksie insidensie,
wat albei staatmaak op realistiese beramings van die akkuraatheid van diag-
nostiese toetse. Die belangrikste bevindings uit ons scenario-modellering toon:
1) Afnemende opbrengste met verhoogde sifting-sensitiwiteit, wat nie duidelik
is in minder soepel modelle nie; 2) groter variansie tussen individue in opspoor-
baarheid en aansteeklikheid lei tot groter oorblywende risiko in ons basis mo-
del, maar laer risiko beramings as in ’n voorheen beskryfde en wyd gebruikte
semi-meganistiese model. Hierdie effekte is sterker wanneer die gemiddelde
periode tussen aansteeklikheid en opspoorbaarheid kort is. Bloedprodukte-
siftingsalgoritmes wat bepaal word deur simulasies met ons modelle, kan sterk
verwagtinge van die residuele risiko oor ’n wye reeks toetsprestasies en pro-
dukrisikovlakke genereer. Ons gee ’n uiteensetting van wanneer eenvoudiger
modelle gebruik kan word en wanneer addisionele nuanses in ag geneem moet
word.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
How often does a blood transfusion result in a chronic viral infection? Ef-
forts to answer this question have been the subject of ongoing research since
the mid 1980s [1]. Modern blood safety achievements have precluded the di-
rect observation of transfusion-transmitted infection (TTI) risk due to the rarity
of infection events. As a result, models are used to estimate the risk faced by
transfusion recipients. Current methods rely on careful characterisation of the
laboratory assays used to screen donated blood products before they are trans-
fused [2], but may be limited by simplistic assumptions. In this work we set out
to clearly describe the situations in which such simplistic characterisations are
likely to be reliable and to explore key features omitted from established models
of transfusion-transmitted infection risk.
Background
Blood transfusions are risky procedures when it comes to viral infections: trans-
fused blood products invariably carry some risk of transfusion transmissible
viruses such as hepatitis B (HBV), hepatitis C (HCV), and human immunode-
ficiency virus (HIV). Efforts to ensure a safe blood supply have driven crucial
developments in the fields of virology, molecular biology, disease testing and,
of course, transfusion medicine [1].
Waves of post-transfusion hepatitis during and after World War II led to the re-
alisation that diseases could be transmitted (from donor to recipient) via blood
transfusions [2]. Since this initial realisation, various efforts have been made
1
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to estimate the risk faced by transfusion recipients. While modern safety mea-
sures have in many cases reduced this risk below the level where it may be
directly measured, in the early days of TTI risk estimation, cases of the dis-
eases of interest among both donors and transfusion recipients could be di-
rectly counted [2, 3, 4]. Efforts to quantify the risk of post-transfusion hepatitis
(PTH) followed the discovery of the hepatitis B surface antigen (a ‘biomarker’
for post-transfusion hepatitis) and the subsequent development of the first vi-
ral assay for hepatitis [5, 6, 7]. Studies aimed at understanding demographic
and behavioural risk factors for transmissible hepatitis measured rates of test-
positivity for HBsAg in both recipients and donors. The results led to the ban-
ning of ‘commercial’ donations and a global shift towards volunteer-only blood
collection [2]. In addition, by screening donated blood for HBsAg, blood banks
were able to further reduce the remaining (residual) risk from donors who were
not identified as being part of high-risk demographic or behavioural groups.
Interestingly, the screening of donated blood products had a much smaller ef-
fect on risk than in donor eligibility requirements, though the same technol-
ogy (viral screening assays) underpinned both measures [1, 2]. Despite the sig-
nificant improvements to blood safety in the early 1980s, as-yet undiscovered
and poorly understood pathogens would continue to threaten the safety of the
global blood supply. The most shocking transfusion-transmitted pathogen, by
far, was the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
During the early years of the HIV pandemic, it is estimated that hundreds
of thousands of HIV infections were transmitted via transfusions, contributing
significantly to the spread of the virus [2, 1]. The shockwaves that emanated
from the realisation that HIV could be, and was being, transmitted via blood
transfusions drove massive investment in HIV testing technology [8, 1]. Once
the first reliable tests (first-generation antibody assays) became available, they
were included in routine blood screening by virtually every blood bank which
could afford it [1]. In conjunction with more stringent donor deferral prac-
tices (including deferring male donors who reported having sex with men) and
donor self-deferral due to increased awareness, blood screening reduced the
risk of transfusion-transmitted HIV (TT-HIV) by several orders of magnitude
[2]. Nonetheless, some residual risk remained: infections were thought to oc-
cur mainly due to donations made by individuals who were recently infected
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and still in the ‘window period’ for HIV (and thus would test negative) [9].
As tests became more advanced, researchers realised that measuring TT-HIV
risk through direct observation was no longer feasible due to the rarity of these
so-called ‘breakthrough’ infections. Efforts to overcome the challenges of risk
estimation in the context of progressively safer blood products led to the de-
velopment and introduction of the incidence per window period (IWP) model,
paving the way for the current era of theoretical risk estimation [10, 11, 12].
Risk estimation in its most prevalent current form assumes the existence of a
period of time (assumed to be the same for all recently infected blood donors)
during which a person will definitely test negative on a routine screening algo-
rithm, and whose blood will definitely cause an infection if it is transfused - the
so-called ‘infectious viraemic window period’, or just ‘window period’[10, 13].
This assumption has been supported by various successful predictions regard-
ing the yield of updated screening algorithms (i.e. the number of new test-
positive cases detected vs another algorithm). While the true risk to recipients is
difficult to assess, and the small numbers of such infections which are detected
preclude strong statistical inference, available evidence suggests that current
methods tend to overestimate risk [2]. Recent approaches have produced more
realistic estimates, and use well-justified assumptions, but are limited in that
they apply only to a specific class of blood screening assay, and do not take into
account inter-subject variability in the dynamics of early HIV infections [14, 15].
Aims
The aims of this work are to develop a generic, flexible approach to modelling
the processes underlying post-screening TTI risk (‘residual risk’), and to explore
the implications for residual risk estimates. We also demonstrate the usefulness
of this generic approach in the fields of incidence estimation and infection dat-
ing - fields in which modelling work relies on the accurate representation of test
performance. To these ends, we address the following questions:
• What is the appropriate level of nuance to incorporate in a model of test
performance?
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• When are nuanced approaches necessary, and when may details be dis-
carded in favour of simple summary parameters?
• What may be learned from a generic approach to modelling test perfor-
mance?
Scope of this work
While many of the concepts presented in this work are relevant to a broad range
of diseases and infections, differences in biology, available data, and relevant
research aims rule out a completely general discussion of any depth. Specific
test characteristics, interpretation rules for test results, and contexts in which
tests are used may all influence results [16]. Where a closer focus is necessary
we address issues related to the detection of ‘early’ HIV infections. HIV has
received extensive research attention from a number of angles, yet remains in
many ways mysterious [17, 18, 19]. In particular, much of the public health
efforts surrounding the HIV pandemic, and accompanying research has had a
strong focus on diagnostic tests [16, 1]. The result has been a wide range of
increasingly accurate and precise HIV tests, along with a plethora of models
utilising assumptions about these tests. While this necessarily reduces the gen-
erality of our implementation, we aim to describe the underlying motivations of
the model in such a way that applying it to another disease would be as straight-
forward as possible. The steps we follow would be most easily generalised to
other transfusion-transmitted viral infections (e.g. HBV, HCV).
The goal of this work is to explore the implications of a new approach to think-
ing about test performance. As such we will attempt to isolate the key details
which must be considered for our purposes, and avoid overly-detailed mod-
elling of underlying processes which are, and will likely remain, only roughly
characterised.
Outline
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce some
necessary terminology and describe various types of tests for disease and infec-
tion. We discuss the basic test performance characteristics and the commonly
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used methods for characterising test performance. We then discuss how the
biology and epidemiology of early HIV infections affect test dynamics and re-
quire us to think beyond summary estimates of test performance characteristics.
We describe a conceptual framework which incorporates these ideas and which
may be applied to a wide range of problems. To demonstrate the framework’s
applicability, we then explore two adjacent areas of study in which a more nu-
anced view of in-situ test performance has already yielded important insights:
incidence estimation and infection dating. In each case we offer a brief sum-
mary of key ideas and sketch how these may be thought of as special cases of
the framework described.
Chapter 3 introduces the focal topic of this work: methods for estimating the
residual risk of transfusion-transmitted infections. We provide an overview
of the history of TTI risk awareness, prevention, and observation, highlight-
ing the numerous challenges and successes encountered in the quest for safer
blood supplies. We review in more detail the current prevailing risk estimation
framework alongside some proposed alternatives, taking note of the benefits,
structural limitations and rationale behind each approach. The incidence per
window period model (IWP) [10, 11] and its successors [20, 13] have, since their
introduction, largely defined the field of residual TTI risk modelling [2, 21]. As
such, we discuss separately the risk estimation methods used prior to the IWP,
the IWP with its successor, and alternative risk estimation models proposed
since the IWP.
Through application of the general conceptual framework described in Chap-
ter 2, Chapter 4 introduces a modification to the prevailing method for esti-
mating risk, based on the idea that infectiousness and detectability of donor-
derived material vary continuously over time for each donor. We discuss the
benefits of this flexibility, as well as the challenges inherent in parameterising
a more nuanced model. We then extend this model, as well as a more recent
risk-estimation method, to incorporate the effects of variability between donors.
Chapter 5 presents risk estimates using these extended models. The effects of
various parametric and distributional assumptions are explored, and results are
contextualised in terms of the underlying models.
Chapter 6 discusses the results, strengths and weaknesses in the proposed
models, and suggests directions for future work. We compare our results to
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those of published risk estimators, outlining the contexts in which the approach
we introduce improves the performance of established methods. We highlight
the value that the approach introduced in this work could bring to other mod-
elling applications which rely on accurate representation of diagnostic test per-
formance, and describe how planning blood product screening algorithms in
light of the results from our model can lead to robust expectations of residual
risk over a wide range of test performance and risk levels.
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Tests for disease and infection
2.1 Background
Tests for disease or infection may be categorised according to what they de-
tect, as well as the purpose for which they are designed, benchmarked and ap-
proved.
Direct tests
Direct tests are designed to detect the presence of physical parts of pathogens
themselves, such as nucleic acid, antigens, entire cells or multi-cellular struc-
tures. Nucleic acid amplification tests (NAT) have been developed to detect
a variety of pathogens and are often considered ’gold-standard’ tests, particu-
larly for viruses [2]. Nucleic acid tests depend on carefully designed molecules
that interact with specific sequences of nucleic acid (RNA or DNA) [22]. If the
target RNA/DNA is present, the NAT procedure replicates target nucleic acids
by many orders of magnitude, enabling direct observation (e.g via Gel Elec-
trophoresis) [23].
‘Quantitative’ NAT testing - which outputs an estimate for the amount of tar-
get nucleic acid in the test sample - requires consistent levels of amplification so
that final observed concentrations may be back-extrapolated to initial concen-
trations. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) NAT assays approximately double
the amount of target nucleic acid in the test well with every amplification cy-
7
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cle, so that once the levels of nucleic acid are high enough to be measured, the
original concentration may be inferred [23]. ’Qualitative’ NAT assays - i.e. NAT
assays which output a ’positive’ or ’negative’ result for each sample - have other
advantages: for example, many transcription-mediated amplification (TMA)
assays are able to detect multiple pathogens in a single test run [24]. This makes
TMA assays a popular choice for the screening of donated blood products, typi-
cally against HIV and Hepatitis B/C. NAT testing may be extremely analytically1
sensitive, and in some cases is thought to be able to detect a single viral nucleic
acid strand present in the test well. In transfusion safety contexts, NAT tests
are at times used in ’minipool’ configuration, known as MP-NAT (rather than
’individual-donation’ or ID-NAT). In MP-NAT, samples from multiple donors
are pooled together before testing, effectively reducing the analytical sensitivity
of the test.
Antigen testing (e.g. P24 antigen testing for HIV) uses chemicals designed
to bond with viral material (antigens) normally targeted by (and which causes
activation of) the immune system. Antigen testing is usually less analytically
sensitive than nucleic acid testing because it does not include an amplification
step, so antigen levels in the test sample must be high enough to give a clear
result (i.e. appear above the background noise) [25, 24].
Culture tests involve inserting a sample of potentially-pathogenic material
into a controlled environment conducive to pathogen growth (e.g. agar gel,
host tissue, etc). After some time, if the pathogen is present, it will likely have
reproduced to the extent that the pathogen or its effects may be directly/indi-
rectly observed (e.g. via microscope analysis or spectroscopy). Culture tests are
considered the gold-standard for a variety of bacterial infections (e.g. tubercu-
losis), but are less common for transfusion-transmitted viral infections [25, 26].
Microscopes may also be used to directly observe some types of pathogen
without the need for culture-based ’amplification’ [24]. This tends to be costly,
particularly for smaller pathogens; as pathogens grow larger direct visual ob-
servation becomes cheaper and more effective. In some cases pathogens may
even be observed directly by the naked eye (e.g. intestinal worms in fecal mat-
ter) [24].
1Analytical sensitivity refers to concentrations at which a test can detect a pathogen with
specified levels of reliability - see Section 2.2.
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Immune response
The human immune system is capable of responding to pathogenic threats in
two broad manners. When dealing with an unrecognized pathogen, the im-
mune system directs and produces generalised immune cells (e.g. macrophages)
to attack the threat. While the generalised attack is underway, more specialised
immune cells (e.g. T-helper cells, and later antibody-producing B cells) interact
with the pathogen [27]. The presence of specialised cells for attacking a partic-
ular pathogen is therefore indicative that the pathogen has itself been present
at some stage in the past. Antibody tests have been developed for a wide range
of diseases and are the cheapest and most commonly used class of tests for HIV
[2]. Antibody tests are often cheap to produce and provide information about
well-controlled and past infections (which direct tests are typically unable to
do). Antibody tests are generally less able than direct tests to detect very early
infections since the immune system requires some time to mount a specialised
response [25].
Outside of the laboratory
Likely the most frequently performed ’tests’ for disease (and hence indirectly
for infection) are not based on tissue samples, chemistry and carefully-controlled
calibration, but on symptoms and case histories observed by healthcare practi-
tioners, caregivers and even individuals ’testing’ themselves. While we do not
focus on these types of tests, the general approach we take could in theory be
adapted to them.
Uses of tests
The other dimension in which tests can be categorised is the intended and/or
formally approved purpose of the tests [25]. Medical professionals, health ad-
ministrators and researchers use tests for disease and/or infection in a variety
of ways. The three primary categories of test-use are clinical diagnostic, screen-
ing, and survey-related - these often overlap in the interest of efficiency and
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ethics2. Clinical diagnostic tests are used to evaluate the condition of individu-
als with the general goal of informing personal health decisions. Screening tests
are used to determine the condition of individuals and determine their suitabil-
ity for a particular activity, such as moving between countries, competing as
a professional athlete, or donating blood. Survey tests are used to generate
data for research into the characteristics of the population and/or disease be-
ing studied. In both screening and survey tests it is common-practice to inform
participants who test positive - though additional confirmation testing may be
required. A particular purpose determines the characteristics of an ’ideal’ test.
The various fields in which tests are used have also driven the development of
new tests which subsequently cross-over between use-cases. Notably, the devel-
opment of currently available highly-sensitive HIV tests, as well as extremely
low-cost rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs), was driven in part by the interplay be-
tween clinical practice and transfusion safety research [1].
2.2 Test performance characteristics: sensitivity and
specificity
The most frequently cited performance metrics of a test for disease or infection
are its diagnostic sensitivity and specificity, usually referred to simply as the
test’s ’sensitivity’ and ’specificity’, and defined as:
• Sensitivity: The probability that a ’true-positive’ sample or subject will
test positive.
• Specificity: The probability that a ’true-negative’ sample or subject will
test negative.
Tests for infection or disease must be formally characterised before they can be
approved for use. While there are many features of prospective tests that must
be specified or investigated, point-value estimates of sensitivity and specificity
are widely used [28]. Definitions of test characteristics must in any practical
2For example, in many cases ethical standards require that study participants receive treat-
ment - in such cases tests are used for both clinical diagnostic and survey-related purposes.
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application be accompanied by a clear definition of ’true-positive’. This is usu-
ally determined by positivity on a gold-standard test, though in a few cases re-
searchers have identified highly probable exposure times in subjects who subse-
quently tested positive, then considered the subject to be ’positive’ subsequent
to the presumed time of infectious exposure. Serial specimens gathered from
such subjects are valuable for characterising early infection dynamics and mea-
suring diagnostic delays [29, 30], since they can shed light on the distribution
of ’eclipse’ phases - periods following infectious exposure when gold-standard
tests are unable to detect infection.
A less-frequently referenced property of laboratory tests is ’analytical sensitiv-
ity’: this refers to the minimum quantity (or concentration) of target biomarker
that a test can detect with some specified probability [31, 18, 15]. For example,
the Procleix Ultrio Plus NAT assay has (according to its package insert) a diag-
nostic sensitivity for HIV of 100%, and analytical sensitivities for HIV of 94%
at 20 ’International Units’ (IU) per ml and 59% at 6 IU per ml [32]. This ex-
ample highlights another issue with characterising test performance - the lack
of standardisation in measuring viral concentrations. So-called ’international
units’ are in fact estimated differently by different labs for each disease - in this
case the publishers of the Procleix Ultrio Plus package insert (Griffols) have pro-
vided an estimate of 0.6 viral RNA copies per IU [32]. While the trend in HIV
research is moving towards the less-ambiguous ’copies per ml’, estimates using
’IU per ml’ continue to be published [28].
Another performance property of tests is their ’diagnostic delay’, referring
to the delay following infectious exposure when a test can ’reliably’ detect the
infection. In this case ’reliable’ detection may be taken to mean a detection
probability close to the official diagnostic sensitivity of the test [24, 16, 20].
Given two tests for the same biomarker, the test with a higher analytical sen-
sitivity will in general have a shorter diagnostic delay (i.e. be able to ’reliably’
detect infections sooner). However, if the same test also has a higher rate of spu-
rious failure, then it would in some contexts have a lower diagnostic sensitivity
than the less analytically sensitive, but more reliable test.
Formal evaluations and characterisations of test performance usually address
the complexity of characterising test performance by stating an achieved di-
agnostic (and at times analytical) sensitivity on a specified panel of samples
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[29, 32, 28]. The sources and sizes of these panels vary from disease to dis-
ease. Blood samples used to benchmark HIV tests are generally frozen plasma
or whole blood samples obtained from individuals whose time of infectious ex-
posure has been established [29]. Ascertaining the time of infectious exposure
requires that subjects have a single high-risk exposure in the period preceding
their first positive test [16]. NAT tests are often published with an analytical sen-
sitivity, obtained on standardised dilutions derived from material with known
DNA/RNA concentrations [15]. While large-scale efforts to collect specimens
from recently infected individuals has allowed some degree of overlap between
the samples used in different test benchmarking efforts, high quality samples
with multiple post-infection collection dates are difficult to obtain, and ethi-
cal obligations constrain the post-infection timeframe in which samples char-
acteristic of untreated infection may be collected [29, 1]. Often only a subset
of these test performance characteristics - diagnostic sensitivity/specificity, an-
alytical sensitivity, and diagnostic delay - are reported by test manufacturers
and approval bodies, though subsequent research has in many cases provided
additional information [29, 30, 33, 34, 28, 26].
Test algorithms
A test algorithm is a set of procedures that specifies a combination of tests which
are to be administered in a given context, along with a recipe for diagnostic in-
terpretation including a precise final case definition [35, 28]. Algorithms may
include multiple tests within one ’layer’ (e.g. "all donations are screened using
one antibody test and one NAT test") as well as conditional tests whose applica-
tion depends on preceding test results (e.g. "patients are screened using rapid
test 1; patients who test negative are tested using rapid test 2") [36]. For exam-
ple, when HIV tests are applied in clinical settings, positive ’screening’ results
are often followed up by ’confirmatory’ or ’supplemental’ tests in order to de-
crease the probability that a true-negative patient will be identified as positive
and undergo unnecessary treatment (i.e. in order to increase the net specificity)
[37, 26].
Test algorithms may be described using the same types of performance met-
rics as their individual constituent tests. The number of specific assumptions
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required in order to make clear statements about these properties increases with
the complexity of the algorithm.
Consider a test algorithm consisting of two tests, with the following rule for
diagnostic interpretation: the sample is classified as negative if either test re-
turns a negative result. If the diagnostic specificities of the two tests are both
90%, and the diagnostic sensitivities of the tests are both 95%, the probability
that a true-negative sample will be classified as negative - i.e. the specificity
of the algorithm - is equal to one minus the probability that both tests return
spurious positive results:
P(−alg|True −) =1− P(+test A|True −)P(+test B|+test A, True −)
=1− 0.12 = 99%.
Using the same classification rule, the probability that a true-positive sample
will be classified as positive - i.e. the sensitivity of the algorithm - is equal to the
probability that both constituent tests return correct positive results:
P(+alg|True +) =P(+test A|True +)P(+test B|+test A, True +)
=0.952 = 90.25%,
i.e., less than the sensitivity of either constituent test.
On the other hand, the same testing procedure (i.e. every sample is tested
using both tests) could be accompanied by a rule for diagnostic interpretation
which classifies a sample as positive if either test returns a positive result. In this
case the sensitivity of the algorithm will be higher than the sensitivity of either
constituent test, since
P(+alg|True +) =1− P(−test A|True +)P(−test B|−test A, True +)
=1− 0.052 = 99.75%.
This classification rule gives the algorithm better sensitivity than the “classify
sample as negative if at least one test returns a negative result” rule, but the
specificity of the algorithm is reduced:
P(−alg|True −) =P(−test A|True −)P(−test B|−test A, True −)
=0.92 = 81%.
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Algorithms which condition the usage of a second ’confirmatory’ or ’supple-
mental’ test on the result of a primary test have similar trade-offs. If the con-
firmatory test is used for subjects who test positive on the primary test, and
both results must be positive for the algorithm to give a positive diagnosis (i.e.
one negative test causes a negative result from the algorithm), then the addi-
tion of the confirmatory test (relative to the single-test algorithm) improves the
specificity of the algorithm at the cost of sensitivity.
The above examples assume that the imperfections of the tests in question
are due to random effects. If the false negatives/positives from the tests are
due instead to anomalies in the chemistry of the test samples (e.g. blood) from
certain subjects, and the two tests have similar or identical chemical/physical
mechanisms, then the probabilities of the tests returning false-negative or false-
positive results are likely to be positively correlated. In the extreme case of
perfectly correlated test results (i.e. P(+test B|+test A) = 1, P(−test B|−test A) =
1, and vice-versa), the algorithm’s sensitivity and specificity would be equal
to those of the constituent tests. If the tests are aimed at detecting the same
biomarker, then correlation between spurious test results can only be reliably
avoided with knowledge of the chemistry and production methods of the tests
going into an algorithm, or data on the observed correlation between the tests
[24]. Unfortunately, detailed information regarding the chemistry and manu-
facturing of tests is not always available to decision makers, nor are published
characterisations of test performance (whether from the manufacturers or inde-
pendent research) which include correlation data [32, 28, 25].
The costs associated with imperfect specificity and sensitivity depend on the
context in which a test is used. False positives in a clinical setting may cause
psychological trauma to patients and lead to unnecessary treatment, with the
associated costs and potential side-effects. False negatives may lead to un-
treated infections and worsened health outcomes for patients, as well as increas-
ing the potential for further transmission [24]. False positives in algorithms for
screening donated blood products leads to wastage of usable blood, while false
negatives may lead to infections in transfusion recipients [26].
The epidemiological context in which tests are performed can also play a sig-
nificant role in their usefulness. This is usually captured with the idea of posi-
tive and negative predictive values (PPV and NPV respectively), which describe
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the probabilities that positive or negative results reflect cases of true-positives
or true-negatives . Given a test with fixed (imperfect) diagnostic sensitivity and
specificity, and a negligibly short period of non-detectability following a sub-
ject’s infectious exposure, the PPV and NPV will depend entirely on the preva-
lence [38]. The following table illustrates a situation in which a population of
1000 people, with a prevalence of 10%, is tested using a test with diagnostic
sensitivity and specificity of 90%.
Table illustrating positive and negative predictive values of a test with diagnos-
tic sensitivity and specificity of 90%, testing for a disease which is immediately
detectable following infectious exposure, in a population of 1000 people with a
true prevalence of 10%.
True status
Test outcome Positive Negative
Positive 90 90
Negative 10 810
The PPV of this combination of test and context is the proportion of of true
positives among subjects who test positive:
PPV =











The PPV of a test increases with increasing prevalence because the imperfect
specificity of the test causes a fixed proportion (in this simplified example) of
the true-negatives to test positive. As such, the ratio of true-positives to test-
positives decreases as the ratio of true-positives to true-negatives decreases. An
in-depth discussion of positive and negative predictive values may be found in
most introductory textbooks to biostatistics and epidemiology [39, 38].
While it is widely acknowledged that performance metrics such as PPV and
NPV are dependent on context, what this may hide is the fact that a test’s sensi-
tivity and specificity also depend, though less drastically, on context. For exam-
ple, the sensitivity of a test which has a long delay between infectious exposure
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and reliable detection (which could be referred to as a test with a long ‘window
period’) depends on the ratio of prevalence to ‘recent’ incidence (where ‘recent’
depends on the test’s diagnostic delay). While this effect is likely small in a
chronic infection, during an outbreak of a highly infectious disease the effective
sensitivity of a test may depend significantly on its diagnostic delay. In surveil-
lance contexts, screening tests may be chosen based on pre-survey estimates of
prevalence and incidence, in order to bring the numbers of false-positives and
false-negatives (which would ideally cancel each other out) nearer to each other
[39, 38].
While distinctions may be drawn between different categories and uses of
tests, the overarching concepts of test dynamics may be applied to any process
aimed at disease detection. Indeed the less regulated and more variable na-
ture of non-laboratory diagnosis illustrates well the unavoidable variability of
test sensitivity and specificity. Somewhere between self-examination and pro-
cedural clinical diagnosis lie the pre-donation screening questionnaires used by
blood transfusion services. These too may be thought of as tests, in the sense
that they have some context-specific, and imperfect, sensitivity and specificity,
each of which will have consequences that in turn depend on the rest of the
test algorithm (‘negative’ questionnaire results lead to donation and laboratory
screening, while ‘positive’ questionnaire results lead to deferral from donating).
The results of the questionnaire will also vary with time for a particular subject
as well as between subjects.
Even further past the realm of laboratory-calibrated test procedures are sur-
vey questionnaires and online data sources such as self-diagnosis websites (e.g.
WebMD), Google Trends and social media platforms. While finding reference
datasets from which to characterise the sensitivity and specificity of these data
sources poses a significant challenge, they could for the purposes of surveil-
lance all be thought of in the same framework, as imperfect tests with outcomes
which will vary over time and between subjects.
Thresholds in test reactivity
The above discussion might lead one to think that test results are either ‘pos-
itive’ or ‘negative’. In most cases however, this binarisation requires a rule
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regarding how to classify some outcome measure (such as luminescence, ab-
sorption of light, etc.) from the physical test itself [24]. Classification rules vary
in their complexity, but in their simplest form involve setting a threshold for
test reactivity, or an analog of this, above/below which a test result is classified
as positive/negative.
2.3 Acute and early HIV infection
The primary source of TT-HIV risk in blood transfusions is from recently-infected
donors. The acute phase of an HIV infection3 is characterised by:
• a period of viral establishment and relatively slow growth: this phase of
an HIV infection is still poorly understood [40, 18], but the virus takes
some time - thought to be on the order of 3 to 6 days [40] - to establish
itself in the lymphoid tissue of the gut [43].
• once established in the lymphoid tissue of the gut, the virus begins a pe-
riod of rapid growth, spreading to lymphoid tissue throughout the body
and establishing reservoirs of latently infected cells. During this phase,
which lasts on the order of 1-2 weeks [43, 40, 31] the viral RNA levels in
plasma (the liquid component of whole blood) exhibit approximately ex-
ponential growth. This aspect of acute HIV infection is so widely agreed
upon that it is a benchmark against which new models of acute HIV infec-
tion are validated [28]. During the early parts of the exponential growth
phase, the immune system mounts a non-specialised (‘innate’) response
to the infection. While this generalised defence is thought to be partially
effective in reducing the reproductive capability of some virions, the in-
crease in immune activity also leads to increased exposure (and hence de-
struction) of CD4 T-cells (the primary target of HIV), so that the overall
effect may even increase viral growth [27, 17]. After some time (on the or-
der of 20 days), the immune system begins to mount an adaptive response
to the infection, targeting specific molecules on some of the HIV strains
3See [40, 41, 42, 17] for in-depth descriptions of the acute phase of HIV and more detailed
modelling efforts.
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present. Interesting to note is that adaptive immune responses take much
longer to target founder virus strains, which are thought to be significantly
more infectious than their generically variant descendants [40, 18]. It is
also worth noting that HIV mutates rapidly, and genetic variants targeted
by the first wave of adaptive immune response may resistant to it within
10-20 days [44].
• Due in part to the success of the adaptive immune responses, as well as
the depletion of CD4 T-cells, viral RNA levels slow into sub-exponential
growth before reaching a maximal ‘peak viral load’ and decreasing fairly
rapidly to a minimum ‘nadir’ viral load, then settling at a roughly fixed
‘set-point viral load’. The delay between infectious exposure and peak
viraemia varies from subject to subject, and peak viraemia is thought to
occur on the order of 25 days after infectious exposure [40, 42, 17].
2.4 A general framework for modelling test
performance
Missing from the usual definitions of test sensitivity and specificity4 is the ac-
counting for the fact that, as time passes following a subject’s infectious expo-
sure to a pathogen, the probability that they will test positive, on a given test
algorithm, changes [16, 14, 18]. In other words, a test algorithm’s sensitivity is
best represented as a continuous function of time. In the case of HIV screen-
ing algorithms, these changes are, effectively, monotonically increasing. Fur-
thermore, the manner in which the probability of testing positive changes with
time, varies from individual to individual.
That test performance changes with time-since-infection is a result of a more
fundamental assertion: biomarker levels in a subject change over time. With the
possible exception of the initial dose (or surgical intervention) biomarker levels
do not jump instantaneously from one level to another but change smoothly
over time. A model sufficiently general to capture every aspect of pathogens
4We focus on sensitivity for the remainder of this work; the concepts applied remain very
similar.
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which prey on humans would necessarily be extremely vague. These assump-
tions are chosen such that they apply well to HIV and other transfusion-transmitted
viral infections. Our assumptions are as follows:
















Figure 2.1: The time-varying detection probabilities of a hypothetical screen-
ing test. The thinner individual curves are generated using cumulative Weibull
distributions, with normally-distributed positional shifts. The sigmoidal part
of each individual curve illustrates the noisiness of measurements as each indi-
vidual transitions from ‘non-detectable’ to ‘detectable’. The shape of the thicker
purple curve illustrates the average probability of detecting an infection at a
particular time following infectious exposure. The shape of the mean detection
probability curve depends primarily on the variability in the individual detec-
tion probability curves.
Firstly, at the time of a subject’s first infectious exposure to a pathogen, the
level of a given biomarker for the pathogen is indistinguishable from zero [16,
40]. This remains the case for some period following exposure.
Secondly, at some stage (since we are talking about an infectious exposure)
biomarker levels will increase. This increase occurs smoothly relative to the
scale of the host’s body, and does not jump instantaneously from one value to
another. As time passes, biomarker levels may fluctuate, plateau, or gradually
increase/decrease, but will change in a smooth manner.
Thirdly, and as a result, the ‘detectability’ of a pathogen (i.e. the probability
that a pathogen will be detected), using a given test algorithm (which may con-
sist only of a single test) for a particular set of biomarkers, will change over time.
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Initially, when biomarker levels are indistinguishable from zero, the probability
that a pathogen will be detected is zero. As biomarker levels initially increase,
the detectability of the pathogen also increases (see Figure 2.1).
Fourthly, for the purpose of residual risk estimation, we observe that the ‘in-
fectiousness’ of blood products, from a donor who has recently experienced
infectious exposure, changes as time passes. In most cases the infectiousness of
blood products will be, effectively, zero at the time of infectious exposure and
will (at least for some initial period) increase over time [15].
There are of course some exceptions to these rules. For example, in cases
where repeat infections occur on short time scales, non-infectious matter from
the pathogen of interest may still be circulating in the body at the time of a sub-
sequent infection. Alternatively, if the dose at exposure is large and exposure
occurs at the same point where test samples are taken or tests are performed
(e.g. for a skin infection seeded by a severe exposure) initial biomarker levels
might be significantly different from zero.
2.5 Incidence estimation
HIV incidence estimation is a key tool for monitoring the progression of the
epidemic as well as for targeting and assessing public health interventions [45,
46]. While estimating the incidence of diseases with short life cycles, such
as measles, is a relatively uncomplicated matter of counting new diagnoses,
for chronic infections such as HIV the matter is much less straightforward.
Longitudinal incidence studies which enroll and routinely test cohorts of HIV-
negative participants are prohibitively expensive due to sample size require-
ments [46]. An alternative to longitudinal studies is the use of ‘biomarker-
based’5 HIV incidence estimation [45, 46]. Biomarker-based HIV incidence esti-
mation relies on specialised test procedures whose performance characteristics
have been adjusted (‘detuned’) to make them much less analytically sensitive.
In its original and most common form, this biomarker-based incidence estima-
tion entails observation (i.e. testing) of a population using a standard diagnostic
5Note that while it is used in a more general sense in this work, the term ‘biomarker’ is
used in the incidence estimation literature to refer to these detuned assays and accompanying
analyses.
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assay - typically an antibody test [47]. Individuals who test positive on the stan-
dard assay are then tested using the detuned tests, known as ‘recency’ assays,
with those who test negative on the detuned tests being classified as ‘recent’.
This allows incidence to be estimated from a single cross-sectional survey, thus
providing cheaper and more timely estimates of incidence [47].
A defining issue for the analytical work on biomarker-based HIV incidence es-
timation is the difficulty in making meaningful and accurate statements about
test performance characteristics; while various biomarker-based methods have
been developed, they often differ in the number of test performance parame-
ters that must be estimated. Kassanjee et al. [46] showed that in general only
two pieces of context-specific information regarding test performance charac-
teristics are required in order to infer incidence from the combined results of
standard and recency assays. These are a ‘false recent rate’ (FRR) specifying the
rate at which ‘non-recent’ infections will be identified as recent under the test
algorithm, and a ‘mean duration of recent infection’ (MDRI) [46]. The MDRI
is defined by the integral
∫ T
0 PRecent(t)dt, and is the mean time subjects spend
in a ‘recent’ state between the moment in which they would likely test posi-
tive on the standard assay at hand, and some cutoff time T (correspondingly,
the FRR is the rate at which subjects test as recent at or after the cutoff time T).
The FRR and MDRI both depend on the choice for cutoff time T, as well as the
threshold used to classify the results of the recency assay (i.e. as either recent or
non-recent). In theory, a perfect recency assay would have an FRR of zero and
a reasonably long MDRI, so that small samples could reliably be used to infer
incidence (though the ideal MDRI would depend on the timescale for which in-
cidence estimates were desired). Given a cutoff time T, the choice of threshold
involves a tradeoff between an the MDRI and the FRR, as illustrated in Figure
2.2 below.
The field of incidence estimation has contributed in a number of ways to the
understanding of HIV infections, test performance characteristics, and statisti-
cal methods for epidemiological surveys [48, 1]. One such contribution that is
of interest to this work is the finding that models which assume that subjects
transition in one direction through binary states of ‘recent’ (definitely testing
negative on the recency assay) to ‘non-recent’, without any possibility of fluctu-
ating test results (e.g. a single subject testing +’ve, −’ve, +’ve on consecutive
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Figure 2.2: Recency assays require a choice of reactivity threshold, with impli-
cations for incidence estimation. Biomarker levels change in different manners
for different subjects (colourful lines in the upper panel). Given a cutoff time
Tcutoff, the choice of threshold (grey lines in upper panel) implies a mean dura-
tion of recent infection (MDRI), indicated by the green lines in the lower panel,
and a false recent rate (FRR) [46].
tests), consistently underestimate the mean duration of recent infection (MDRI)
[46].
2.6 Infection dating
Inferring the likely time of an individual’s infectious exposure is frequently of
interest to patients, caregivers and researchers alike [16]. From a research per-
spective, inferring likely times of infectious exposure is useful when collecting
specimens for the characterisation of new diagnostic tests [30], estimating the
frequency with which recently infected people present to donate blood [20],
and understanding disease progression. Until recently, the only widely-used
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infection dating system that utilised qualitative diagnostic test results was the
“Fiebieg staging system” [13]. The Fiebieg system divides time-since-infection
into a number of discrete stages during which subjects are presumed to test
positive on certain tests, and negative on others. For example, a subject in the
second “Fiebieg stage” tests positive on an RNA (NAT) assay and a P24 antigen
assay, but does not yet test positive on an antibody assay [13]. This ’state’, ac-
cording to Fiebieg et al [13], lasts an average of 3.2 days, and begins an average
of 13.9 days after infectious exposure. The Fiebieg system is limited in two key
ways. Firstly, it is defined for a specific set of assays, many of which are no
longer widely used or even available to purchase. Attempts have been made to
create new versions of the system with modern assays, but as time passes and
the number of available (and historical) assays increases, the usefulness of clas-
sifications such as “Fiebieg Stage 2” fades, and the amount of work required to
fully characterise all the possible combinations of concordant/discordant test
results increases rapidly [16]. Secondly, the Fiebieg system only accommodates
discordant test results which take place at the same point in time; in practice,
test samples may be collected on different days. In addition, the Fiebieg concept
does not accommodate discordant test results for the same test, or for different
tests with an ’unexpected’ order of discordancy (i.e. a more sensitive test giving
a negative result while less sensitive a test returns a positive result) [16, 13].
In a recently published article, we generalised the Fiebieg staging concept to
incorporate arbitrary combinations of discordant and concordant test results,
for tests taken at different times, without the need to specify the order in which
subjects transition from one fixed ’stage’ to another [16]. All that is required for
the model to work is a time-varying ’detectability’ curve for both tests, which
specifies the probability that a subject tests positive, as a function of the delay
between the time of infectious exposure and the time at which the test takes
place. Since the time taken to transition from testing negative to testing positive
is for most subject/test conditions short, compared to the inter-subject variation
in delays between infectious exposure and testing positive, these detectability
curves may be reasonably inferred from knowledge of a test’s mean delay, com-
bined with the variability in that delay. The likelihood that a subject was in-
fected at a particular time may be calculated as the joint likelihood (in this case
a product) of two test results, given the particular time of infection (Figures 2.3
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and 2.4). A point estimate for the likely time of infection may be taken as the
midpoint between the 50% detection probabilities for the two tests, or could
in theory be calculated as an expectation value of the (normalised) likelihood
function. The code base developed as part of this thesis (see Section 4.3) was
used to implement the infection dating concepts described here, as well as to
produce figures for the manuscript [16].








Test 1 (negative)                        Test 2 (positive)                                        
d1 d2
P(t Infection | T1 (–))
P(t Infection | T2 (+))
P(t Infection | T1 (–) & T2 (+))
Figure 2.3: The likelihood of each hypothetical infection time (dashed black line)
is given by the product of the independent infection time likelihoods given by
each of the two simultaneous discordant test results (green and orange lines).
d1 and d2 indicate the mean diagnostic delays to 50% detection probability of
the two tests. The likelihoods for each hypothetical infection time, given the test
results, forms a plateau roughly as wide as the gap between the two test dates,
but not lying exactly between them.
In Figure 2.3, the black dashed curve (a soft-edged plateau) depicts the likeli-
hood of each hypothetical time of infection leading to the observed (discordant)
test results. A positive test result implies that the infection was not very recent,
with positive results on less sensitive tests (i.e. tests with a longer mean diag-
nostic delay) providing more information than positive results on more sensi-
tive tests (since less sensitive tests exclude a larger amount of recent time) [16].
On the other hand, increasing sensitivity makes negative results more infor-
mative. In theory (excluding test failure) the most informative discordant test
results would arise when a less sensitive test shows a positive result while a
more sensitive test shows a negative result - this is however highly unlikely to
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. TESTS FOR DISEASE AND INFECTION 25
occur. More likely is a subject showing different test results when tested multi-
ple times using the same test on the same day (Figure 2.4) [16]. The information
value of test results also depends on the shape of the tests’ sensitivity curves -
more variability across the population in delays to testing positive on a particu-
lar test results in a flatter sensitivity curve and less informative infection dating
inferences. The shapes of the sensitivity curves are of less importance when the
difference in mean diagnostic delays is large (as in Figure 2.3). On the other
hand, when the difference in mean diagnostic delays is small, uncertainty in
the timing of infection is driven primarily by the shapes of the test’s sensitivity
curves (Figure 2.4) [16]. See Section 5.1 for a related discussion, and [16] and
[49] for a more complete description of this approach.











P(t Infection | T1 (–))
P(t Infection | T2 (+))
P(t Infection | T1 (–) & T2 (+) )
Figure 2.4: The likelihood of each hypothetical time of infectious exposure
(dashed black line) is given by the product of the independent likelihoods given
by each of the two non-simultaneous discordant test results (green and orange
lines). d1 and d2 indicate the mean diagnostic delays to 50% detection probabil-
ity of the two tests.
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Chapter 3
A review of transfusion transmitted
risk estimation methods
3.1 Transfusion-transmitted viral infection risk
Efforts to mitigate the risk of transfusion-transmitted infections (TTI’s) in do-
nated blood products have led to massive improvements in the safety of the
global blood supply. Nevertheless, some risk remains - the primary source of
risk for infections for which routine screening is in place comes from donations
given after infectious exposure (when the donated material is potentially in-
fectious) but before detection is probable [10, 2]. The amount of risk depends,
along with epidemiological factors, on the safety procedures in place. These
safety measures cost money and/or reduce the available supply of blood prod-
ucts, and questions naturally arise such as, "how much risk does each safety
measure preclude?" or "how many infections might be prevented by improving
safety procedures (or ‘caused’ by relaxing them)?". In order to address such
questions, a number of risk estimation methods, also known as risk estimators,
have been developed.
Risk estimators are useful for evaluating and comparing the public health im-
plications of test algorithms, for example, when choosing among screening tests
for various diseases given a limited budget, justifying additional expenditure
on newly-available tests, or predicting the additional risk posed by alterations
to donor eligibility criteria [1, 2, 50, 51].
26
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Transfusion practice has evolved over the past five decades, and a full histor-
ical account would be impractical. Here we offer an introduction to the basic
concepts in transfusion safety as they apply to the prevention of transfusion-
transmitted HIV infections. The existence of chronic viral infections that could
be transmitted via blood transfusions was first recognized during World War II,
when post-transfusion hepatitis (PTH) was reported among US troops [1]. Stud-
ies to investigate and quantify the sources and extent of PTH risk began only in
1964 with a Boston-based retrospective study of PTH in transfusion recipients
[52, 53, 1]. This study, which identified transfusion recipients with symptomatic
PTH, found that the incidence of PTH was more than four times higher in re-
cipients of blood from so-called ‘commercial’ donors (who were paid for their
donations) than in recipients of blood from non-remunerated voluntary donors.
The first prospective study of PTH was published in 1970 and showed a tenfold
greater risk for recipients of commercial versus voluntary donations [54]. The
study found that more than 50% of surviving open-heart surgery patients who
received blood from commercial donors subsequently developed hepatitis [53].
These findings were instrumental in the United States Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) and other regulatory agencies banning the use of commercial
donors and legislating a volunteer-only blood donation system [55].
Another crucial step for blood safety made during this period was the identi-
fication of the Hepatitis B Surface Antigen (HBsAg) and methods for detecting
its presence in blood samples [56]. Samples collected during the first prospec-
tive study of PTH were used to confirm the connection between the presence
of HBsAg and clinical hepatitis. It had been estimated during this time that
screening blood using first- or second- generation tests for HBsAg would elim-
inate approximately 25% of PTH [57, 58]; this was confirmed by a subsequent
study [59], and from 1971 forward it became standard ‘best-practice’ to screen
all donations for HBsAg [1]. As tests became more advanced, improved risk re-
duction via screening became possible. The persistence of PTH following these
improvements led to the discovery of hepatitis C (initially called ‘non-A, non-B
hepatitis’) in the early 1980s, and to the development of the first laboratory tests
for hepatitis C [1, 54].
The blood safety successes of the 1970s and early 1980s were eclipsed, even as
they were realised, by the appearance of ‘transfusion-transmitted AIDS’ (in fact
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transfusion-transmitted HIV) in the early 1980s [1]. The shock of TT-AIDS led
to a number of studies aimed at identifying risk factors for AIDS in potential
donors [60]. Notably, the early studies on TT-AIDS involved creating massive
repositories of specimens from blood donors. Such repositories proved invalu-
able both at the time and for decades afterwards [1]. Despite considerable effort
and attention, it took some years before blood safety improvements were able
to substantially slow the contribution of blood transfusions to the HIV/AIDS
epidemic: retrospective studies estimated that in 1982 the risk of HIV infection
per transfusion was ≈ 1.1% in the United States [61]. As with post-transfusion
hepatitis, the majority of transfusion-transmitted HIV (TT-HIV) risk was elimi-
nated by modifying the donor pool to defer donors from groups shown to be at
high risk of HIV infection [62]. The introduction of antibody screening (begin-
ning in 1985) gradually eliminated most of the risk from donors who were not
deferred [1, 2]. Subsequent advancements in screening tests further narrowed
this residual risk and, in the current era, the risk of TT-HIV in many parts of
the world has been reduced to miniscule levels [2]. A necessary side-effect of
the improvements made to reduce the incidence of transfusion-transmitted HIV
was that estimating risk directly from cohort studies, which already required
large groups of transfusion recipients, ceased to be a viable means of risk mea-
surement [2]. The primary tool remaining which could be used to observe new
cases of transfusion-transmitted HIV, HBV, and HCV was the so-called ‘look-
back’ study.
Lookback studies
Direct observational data on transfusion-transmitted infections is difficult to
collect [2, 36, 63]. In order to estimate, based on observations of infection events,
the per-incident-donor risk of infection, one would ideally like to know the total
number of ‘successful’ donors (i.e. donors who passed the pre-donation screen-
ing questionnaire) who have experienced an infectious exposure, the infection
status for all recipients of their post-exposure donations, and, in cases where
both a donor and recipient test positive, the genetic profiles for both infections1.
1Genetic information from infections in recipients can be compared with genetic informa-
tion from infections in donors to identify which recipient infections were caused by transfused
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The ‘risk per incident donor’ would then be:
Riskper incident donor =
# Infections caused by transfused material
# Incident donors
.
Since the advent of modern transfusion medicine and growing awareness of
TTI risk in the 1980s, donors who are known to be sick have been excluded, as
have those with ‘high-risk’ lifestyle factors2 such as injection drug use [26, 50].
As such, to observe the infection status of a donor, either the donor must be
followed up and tested, or a sample of their blood must be stored at the time of
donation and re-tested at a later date with a more-sensitive test than was used
at the time of donation. Both of these data-collection strategies are expensive,
and yield fairly uncertain data [26]; positive follow-up tests leave substantial
uncertainty in the timing of infectious exposure, and hence in the status of the
donor at the time of donation. In cases where stored samples are re-tested with a
more sensitive test than was used at the time of donation, even the most analyt-
ically sensitive tests available may not detect every potentially infectious dona-
tion. These processes of donation, transfusion, and follow-up must be repeated
many times in order to garnish an informative data set [29, 30]. In addition,
many transfusion recipients die shortly after receiving a transfusion, ruling out
direct observation of their potential TTI’s [2, 36]. Rather than attempt to follow
up and test every donor and recipient, researchers have opted for a more realis-
tic data-collection strategy known broadly as ‘lookbacks’. There are two types
of lookback study: donor-triggered, and recipient triggered. A lookback study
involves [64, 65, 66, 63]:
• Identifying an already-transfused donation which may have been infec-
tious. Repeat donors (i.e. donors who have donated before, in contrast
with first-time donors) who donate a test-positive blood sample can trig-
ger the investigation, as can recipients who test positive and report the
result to the blood service (usually via their healthcare provider).
• Locating and contacting the recipients and donors of the potentially in-
fectious donation. If the lookback is triggered by a positive-testing donor,
material [36].
2The definition of ‘high-risk’ lifestyle factors has changed over time - see [50] for recent
example.
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confirmatory tests are performed on the donor; if the donor tests positive,
the recipient is also tested. If the lookback is triggered by a positive-testing
recipient, the donor is tested.
• If both donor and recipient test positive then case histories and, more re-
cently, genetic analysis of the viral strains carried by each person, are used
to investigate whether the recipient’s infection was caused by the donation
they received.
Names of transfusion recipients are often recorded in the administrative databases
of transfusion services or healthcare providers administering transfusions [26,
36]. Based on these details, lookback administrators will attempt to contact re-
cipients identified as being ‘at risk’ and request their participation in the study.
None of the lookback steps are perfect, and some attempts fail; the success
rate of the process varies widely over time and between countries. As many
as 80% or as few as 15% of donors/recipient combinations might be contacted
and tested in each lookback study [64, 65, 66, 63].
Once recipients of blood from an infected donor are identified, if they test
positive for the pathogen in question it must be ascertained whether their in-
fection was caused by the potentially-infectious donation. This may be done in
a number of ways - in the first lookback studies, ascertainment of the source of
infection was attempted by asking the donor and recipient detailed questions
regarding potential non-transfusion exposure risks [1]. Transfusion was con-
sidered to be the cause of infection if no other likely infectious exposure could
be identified, and if it were deemed ‘possible’ that the donor was already in-
fected at the time of donation. In some modern studies, the genetics of the
viral strains obtained from donor and recipient are compared to assess whether
the infection was caused by the transfusion, or whether the recipient acquired
the infection from another source [36]. As the world’s transfusion safety has
improved, cases of transfusion-transmitted infection have become rare, partic-
ularly in settings where rigorous lookback studies are performed and published
[67]. Events worthy of lookback are sparse, and while methods for performing
lookbacks have advanced (e.g. digital record keeping and affordable tools for
genetic analysis), observed cases are few to be found [2, 36].
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Despite their limitations, lookback procedures continue to be the most realistic
method for observing transfusion-transmitted infections and assessing the ac-
curacy of theoretical risk estimates. In countries with widely-deployed nucleic-
acid testing, such as the USA and South Africa, theoretical calculations predict
between 5 and 15 times as many transfusion-related HIV transmissions as look-
back studies have observed [2, 36]. Likely sources for this discrepancy include:
• approximately half of blood transfusion recipients die soon after receiving
their transfusion.
• recipients who die as a result of the health complications which necessi-
tated transfusion may receive more transfused blood (since their injuries
are more severe) than those who survive.
• some identified recipients (of potentially infectious donations) cannot be
contacted, or refuse to take part in the study, and some donors may never
return after providing an infectious donation.
While lookbacks remain the most realistic means for identifying transfusion
transmission events, easier-to-observe quantities are often used to monitor TTI
risk. For example, it is interesting to track the number of donors who test neg-
ative on one test, but positive on the other, as this provides some information
about the timing of infectious exposures relative to donation [13, 20]. So-called
‘NAT-yield’ donations - donations which test positive on a NAT assay, but neg-
ative on all other screening tests (e.g. P24 antigen and antibody assays) - are
a key data source for the prevailing risk-estimation method of the current era
[20, 35] (see section 3.2 for details).
Lookback studies have played a critical role in the history of blood safety and
virology. Evidence from lookbacks contributed to the discovery of the hepati-
tis C virus and to the introduction of NAT testing for HIV in many countries
[1, 63]. They have also provided data which supports the idea that donations
from an infected donor are, at least for some period of time following infectious
exposure, neither completely infectious nor completely safe [68, 69].
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Infectiousness
A key piece of information for estimating TT-HIV risk is the probability that a
recipient of a blood product, from a donor who has experienced an infectious
exposure prior to donating, will become infected [14]. We refer to this probabil-
ity as the ‘infectiousness’ of the blood product.
The ‘per-act’ transmission risk for HIV has received considerable attention.
While the focus has primarily been on sexual acts, for which many estimates
exist [70, 71, 72], a number of attempts have been made to quantify the risk of
infection occurring in recipients of transfused material derived from an HIV-
infected donor [71]. These ‘per-act’ risk (i.e. infectiousness) estimates for trans-
fusion are based on observations from the early years of the HIV pandemic,
when large numbers of patients were transfused with blood from HIV infected
donors who were in various stages of infection, and whose viral loads were con-
trolled only by their own immune systems [71]. The results are and were stag-
gering, showing very high average risk (> 90%) for recipients of blood from in-
fected donors, and helped drive substantial improvements to blood safety [71].
The high levels of infectiousness possible among infected donors highlight the
need for continued vigilance and implementation of donor screening [2]. How-
ever, such estimates of infectiousness, which are from an era when established
(non-recent) infections made up the majority of infection risk, have limited rel-
evance when estimating TTI risk in modern blood banks, as the comparable
group of donors would include those with long-standing infections, who are
excluded from donating by a combination of pre-donation screening and anti-
body testing.
Studies estimating per-act HIV infection risk in areas other than transfusion
(sexual acts, needle sharing, etc.) have shown that several factors affect the per-
act transmission risk, including viral load, stage of infection, and the conditions
to which the virus is exposed between leaving the host and potentially seeding
a new infection [71, 70]. The occurrence of these factors has changed since the
majority of data on the infectiousness of HIV via transfusion was gathered. For
example, the cold-chain processes for blood post-donation have changed over
time due to technological improvements and lower equipment costs [26].
Each type of donor-derived material has its own implications for residual TTI
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risk, which in turn depend in knowable and un-knowable ways on the details
of transfusion practice in a particular blood bank [37]. The most common types
of donor-derived material are plasma, red blood cell (RBC) components, and
platelet concentrates (PLT). In many blood banking systems, plasma is ‘quaran-
tined’ in cold storage until a subsequent donation by the same donor is deter-
mined to be infection-negative, thus effectively eliminating TTI risk in plasma
(from chronic diseases for which blood is screened) [26]. Red blood cell compo-
nents, however, degrade when frozen and must be transfused within 42 days
of collection [35]. While HIV does not infect red blood cells, when whole blood
is fractionated into components, RBC components contain a small quantity of
residual plasma. As a result, in contexts where plasma is quarantined, the pri-
mary source of transfusion-transmitted HIV risk is thought to stem from this
small quantity (approximately 20ml) of plasma contained in each unit of red
blood cell component [14].
In summary, the risk to transfusion recipients depends on both the preva-
lence and incidence of infections in successful donors (donors who pass the
pre-donation screening), coupled with the performance characteristics of the
screening algorithm being used, the type of material being transfused, and the
conditions to which donated blood is exposed prior to transfusion.
3.2 The incidence per window period model
The first major purely-theoretical risk estimation method, and by far the most
successful in terms of adoption, has been the ‘incidence rate per window period
model’ (IWP) [1, 21, 35].
Since the widespread adoption of antibody screening and donor deferral poli-
cies in the late 1980s, TT-HIV risk in blood banks3 has been primarily due to
donations from recently-infected (or ‘incident’) donors, whose blood products
may test negative on screening tests and subsequently cause infections in recip-
ients [73, 21, 2]. The probability that an incident donor’s donation will lead to
an infection is related to the probability that their blood will test negative for
HIV (and therefore be transfused), and the probability that their blood contains
3This applies to blood banks following the most basic modern safety guidelines. Blood
banks which do not screen or test donors may still exist, but are not discussed here.
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sufficient quantities of viable HIV virions to seed an infection in the transfusion
recipient. In other words, the donor’s infection must be simultaneously unde-
tectable (or at least undetected) and infectious (at least, cause an infection) at the
time of donation.
The IWP model assumes that donors transition between states of non-detectable
and non-infectious, non-detectable but infectious (the ‘infectious stage of the
viraemic window period’, or simply ‘window period’4), and detectable (infec-
tiousness is irrelevant if an infection is perfectly detectable) [11, 74, 10].
The model assumes that the ‘window period’ - in which the donor’s blood
tests negative on a given test algorithm, and is (potentially) infectious if trans-
fused - begins at some time shortly after infectious exposure, and lasts for the
mean diagnostic delay of the test being used [11, 73].
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Figure 3.1: The so-called ‘infectious window period’ may be thought of in the
general model as the product of two step functions, resulting in a perfectly flat-
topped plateau. The ‘window period’ illustrated here represents the assump-
tions of the new incidence per window period model
At the time the model was proposed, ‘incidence’ could only be observed among
repeat donors - donors who had donated before5. Donated material undergoes
testing at every donation, so a test-negative donation followed by a test-positive
4Usage of term ‘window period’ varies somewhat with context.
5Donors who have donated before but who have not donated for a sufficiently long time
are sometimes referred to as ‘lapsed’ donors.
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donation indicates that infectious exposure must have taken place either be-
tween the donations, or during a short interval preceding the test-negative do-
nation. First-time donors, on the other hand, test positive (or negative) at the
time of donation, yielding no information6 regarding whether their infection (if
present) is new or long-standing. Positive-testing donors have, since the advent
of antibody screening, been deferred from donating in future. Coupled with the
fact that the potential window for exposure is much larger for first-time donors,
this causes rates of test-positivity in first-time donors to be much higher than in
repeat donors [20, 36].
In order to estimate the risk per incident donor, the size of the window period
is divided by the average inter-donation interval of repeat donors:




Assuming that the donation rate of incident donors is unaffected by their infec-
tious exposure, this can be interpreted as the probability that a donation from
an incident donor will be given in the window period.
The probability that a donation takes place during the window period (which
in the IWP is equal to the risk per incident donor) is then multiplied by the prob-
ability that a donation is from an incident donor, obtained by dividing the total
number of incident donors by the total number of donations, to calculate the
average risk, per transfused blood product, that a transfusion recipient faces. In
equation 3.2 the total number of donations is multiplied by the average inter-





Two major concerns were voiced by the authors of the IWP at the time of
publication:
1. The incidence and donation rate in first-time donors was not measurable,
and had to be estimated in subsequent studies 7.
6This applies to the antibody-only HIV screening algorithms used at the time.
7Interestingly, the ratio of first-time to repeat donor incidence varied significantly across the
world, even between regions with similar overall donor incidence [75]
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2. The model assumes that donation rates are uniform, and independent of
the timing of infectious exposure. It was suggested that donors might self-
defer following risky exposure, and that people might knowingly donate
blood following a risky exposure in order to obtain a free (high quality)
test of their infection status.
The ‘new Incidence per Window Period Model’ (nIWP) was developed in re-
sponse to these concerns and with the availability of new data from screening
algorithms, which included NAT testing as well as antibody and (in some cases)
P24 Antigen testing [20]. Based on the Fiebieg staging concept [13], in the nIWP,
donors who test positive on NAT screening, but negative on antibody and/or
antigen testing (’NAT-yield’) are assumed to have recently experienced infec-
tious exposure. The ability to identify donors who are HIV-positive but who
have not yet ‘seroconverted’ (i.e. test negative on antibody tests) allows for
more precise identification, and a new definition, of ‘incident’ donors. Data on
donations made near to the time of infectious exposure are naturally relevant to
residual risk calculations, and the NAT-yield approach to estimating incidence
in the IWP confers two advantages:
• the NAT-yield approach allows observation of incidence in first-time donors,
rather than crudely adjusting the incidence observed in repeat donors us-
ing estimates from other studies.
• the NAT-yield analysis requires weaker assumptions surrounding dona-
tion rates - there is a smaller time period (relative to infectious exposure)
over which it is assumed that recently infected donors donate at a con-
stant rate (for the original IWP, this period was the entire inter-donation
interval).
The nIWP is still based on the concept of a ‘window period’ in which sub-
jects are simultaneously infectious and undetectable, and assumes that infec-
tiousness begins when a donor has an average viral load of 1 copy per 20ml of
plasma - the viral load at which it becomes likely that at least one virion will be
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present in the plasma portion of a single red blood cell component8. The size of
the window period is calculated by back-extrapolating a model of exponential
viral growth from the 50% detection threshold of a particular MP-NAT assay
(Gen-Probe TMA) to the 120 copies per ml assumed infectious limit. The rate of
‘window period’ donations is calculated based on the rate of donations which
occupy a chosen Fiebieg stage:
Rate WP donations =
Window period
Fiebieg stage
× Rate Donations in Fiebieg stage ,
where "Fiebieg stage" in the denominator indicates the mean duration of the
chosen Fiebieg stage. Drawing on the Fiebieg staging concept introduces rich
sources of data to the nIWP, but brings with it conceptual and practical limita-
tions:
1. Fiebieg stages are defined for specific assays, none of which are widely
used today, and few of which are even commercially available. While at-
tempts have been made to define ‘new Fiebieg stages’ based on newer as-
says, the proliferation of tests makes characterising the numerous possible
combinations unrealistic [16].
2. Individual donors are imagined to transition instantaneously between states
of completely infectious and perfectly detectable.
3. All donors are assumed to experience Fiebieg stages (and window peri-
ods) of identical length - i.e. variability between donors and/or recipients
is not considered.
The IWP9 represented a groundbreaking shift in the way residual TTI risk was
estimated [1]. The IWP has been widely adopted by blood safety researchers
worldwide, and remains by and large the standard method with which to esti-
mate residual TTI risk [35].
8While the authors of the initial IWP recognized that their model was (conservatively) es-
timating the risk that a ‘potentially infectious’ unit of blood would enter the blood supply (i.e.
without quantifying the magnitude of the risk to the recipient), subsequent applications of the
model have not always drawn this distinction [76, 77, 78]
9We refer hereinafter to the nIWP as simply the IWP; the differentiation is useful primarily
for the purposes of historical review.
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3.3 Semi mechanistic model (post-IWP)
Alternative approaches to the IWP have been proposed. Two primary directions
have been taken which expand upon the IWP’s approach. Bish et al. proposed
risk estimation methods which leverage detailed manipulation of the mathe-
matical expressions underlying incidence rate estimates and window period
sizes [79, 80]. The approach, while interesting, relies on numerous unstated as-
sumptions regarding the underlying processes, many of which are difficult or
impossible to verify. Nonetheless, it highlights an interesting approach to the
problem of designing blood screening algorithms, taken from an engineering
perspective [81, 80]. The other main direction was developed by Weusten et al.,
who proposed a semi-mechanistic model for extending the IWP, with simple
and transparent assumptions, and clear derivations [14]. The work of Weusten
et al. has been generally accepted as a useful tool for blood safety modelling
[36, 35]. We focus our application of the concepts described in Chapter 2 on the
semi-mechanistic model proposed by Weusten et al.
In other cases, researchers have taken a completely different tack to estimat-
ing risk: for example, the analysis by Jayaraman et al. [82] suggests that WP
risk is not the primary source of TT-HIV risk in sub-saharan Africa; they ‘con-
servatively’ assume that in countries for which information regarding blood
screening practice is not ‘available’, blood is not screened at all. Despite such
bold assumptions, some of the methods used to connect the assumptions with
risk estimates appear reasonable. Nonetheless, the work seems unlikely to have
any bearing on policy in the countries concerned (unless perhaps to prompt bet-
ter sharing of blood screening policy). Indirectly estimating the risk in contexts
without screening of donor-derived material is difficult to accomplish from a
distance, since the sensitivity of pre-donation screening questionnaires depends
on context, pre-donation screening procedures are less standardised than direct
tests of donor-derived material, and incidence in the potential donor pool is
hard to measure in such settings.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. A REVIEW OF TRANSFUSION TRANSMITTED RISK
ESTIMATION METHODS 39
The semi-mechanistic model described by Weusten et al.
Weusten et al. have described a method for calculating the effective size of
the IWP models’ ‘infectious viraemic window period’ under NAT testing algo-
rithms10 [15]. In place of back-extrapolation to determine the magnitude of a
strict ‘gap’ between an ‘onset of infectiousness’ and an ‘onset of detectability’,
both infectiousness and detectability are modelled as functions of plasma viral
load concentration, which is in turn modelled as a function of time [15, 14]. We
follow here the derivations of Weusten et al. [14], expanding some of the steps
for added clarity.
Starting at the beginning of viral doubling, the model uses a single viral load
trajectory with exponential growth. Specifically, every donor’s viral load is as-
sumed to be given by C(t) = C02
t
λ , where C0 is the plasma viral load at the
beginning of viral doubling, t is the time since the onset of viral doubling, and
λ is the viral load doubling time. Since the model is designed to estimate risk
in the context of NAT testing, it does not consider the dynamics of infection
beyond the initial period of viral doubling. This appears to be reasonable since
even less sensitive PCR NAT assays with large sample pools would typically
achieve reliable detection rates within the viral doubling stage [14, 40, 18].
The model uses the viral load trajectory as an input to determine infection and
detection probabilities (i.e. infectiousness and detectability). Infectiousness is
modelled by assuming that virions in the transfused material have an average
‘per-virion infectiousness’ (pV); that is, every virion which enters the recipient’s
body has a probability pV of causing an infection, and a probability 1− pV of
not causing an infection. The probability that no infection results from the trans-
fusion of n virions is therefore 1− (1− pV)n. Virions which are destroyed (or
rendered non-viable for seeding infection) between donation and transfusion
are still counted, and may be thought of as being incorporated into the value of
pV. One could equivalently increase pV and consider only virions which sur-
vive through transfusion; these are mathematically equivalent in the model as
described by Weusten et al. [14].
10In practice, blood which is screened for HIV using NAT assays is also screened for antibod-
ies, since so-called ‘elite controllers’ as well as people on successful ART may present to donate
and ‘pass’ the screening questionnaire.
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The model further assumes that the number of virions transfused is a Poisson-
distributed random variable, depending only on the volume V of plasma in the
transfused component, and the concentration C of virions in the plasma, so that




The assumption of Poisson-distributed virion samples allows for arbitrarily large
numbers of virions; this is considered an acceptable compromise for the sake of
mathematical simplicity, since the probability of drawing unreasonably large
numbers of virions vanishes quickly (e.g. with a plasma viral load of 1 copy-
/ml, the expected number of virions in one RBC unit is 20, and the probability
of the component containing more than 42 virions is less than 0.001%). The
































= 1− e−C·V·pV . (3.3)
Each donation is accompanied by a set of samples used to screen for TTI’s,
including one or more samples used to screen for HIV. In the semi-mechanistic
model described by Weusten et al., the probability that a sample will test posi-
tive on a single test is assumed to follow a probit function of the log of the viral
load: P(+) = Φ(a + b log(x)), where a and b are parameters describing the
test’s properties, x is the average concentration of RNA particles in a subject’s
blood expressed in ‘copies per aliquot of volume used in the test well’, and Φ is
a standard cumulative normal distribution function [14]. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.2, a performance characteristic typically reported for NAT assays is the
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analytical sensitivity - stated in terms of viral loads (concentrations) at which a
test is able to detect specified percentages (e.g. 50% and 95%) of true-positive
samples [32, 26]. If x50 is the viral concentration at which the test is able to
detect 50% of positive samples, and x95 is the concentration at which the test
detects 95% of positive samples, the parameters of the probit distribution can
be inferred. Defining z to be such that Φ(z) = 0.95 and noting that Φ(0) = 0.5,
it follows that
a + b log(x95) = z and a = −b log(x50)










Given a minipool size Spool (with Spool = 1 for ID-NAT), the probability that
a donation from a recently infected donor will test negative at time t after the
beginning of exponential growth is
P(−) = 1−Φ
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where χ is the number of RNA molecules per virion - two, in the case of HIV.
This result was extended by Weusten et al. [14] to include multi-test screening
procedures such as re-testing positive donations for confirmation (P(−|k retests) =
P(−)k) or re-testing individual samples from pools which test positive (P(−) =
P(−)pool × P(−)ID); such procedures would in theory increase the total risk
compared to discarding all samples linked to a positive-testing sample pool but
may be necessary to reduce wastage, particularly when minipool testing is used
[14, 26].
At any one time, the probability that a recently infected donor’s blood will
both test negative and cause an infection in the recipient is given by the prod-
uct P(infectious) × P(nondetection). The total number of ‘risk-day equiva-




P(detectable)dt. The quantity of ‘risk-day equivalents’ naturally has units of
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time, and corresponds in risk estimation to the same quantity as the length of
the ‘infectious viraemic window period’.
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Figure 3.2: The probability that a red blood cell component from a recently-
infected donor ultimately causes an infection in a transfusion recipient depends
on the timing of their donation relative to the onset of exponential viral growth.
This probability (a likelihood, when viewed as a function of time) is given by
the joint probability (purple dotted line), that the screened sample will test neg-
ative on the screening algorithm used (green line) and will cause an infection if
transfused (i.e. the infectiousness of the blood product, orange line), calculated
at each point in time using the product of the individual probabilities. Calcula-
tion based on the model described by Weusten et al. (2011) [14], using a single
Procleix Ultrio HIV assay in ID-NAT configuration [32].
Note that this model of nondetection probability does not explicitly consider
the number of virions which appear in the test well, though it is possible for
sensitive NAT tests to detect as little as a single virion. The probit analysis is
used to accommodate the heterogeneity inherent in the sample collection pro-
cess. At first glance, one might think to use a Poisson distribution - however,
the small blood samples used for testing are not drawn from a large well-mixed
container; virion concentrations in a subject’s bloodstream may fluctuate over
time, as the immune system responds to external stimuli, etc. Modelling this
deviation from homogeneity explicitly would be challenging, and the probit
analysis represents a middle ground between explicit modelling and simpler
statistical models - it fits the available data better than a Poisson-distribution,
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and can be thought of as combining the observed properties of the assay (i.e.
the available data) with the inherent heterogeneity of the data collection pro-
cess [83, 25, 84, 15].
The model described by Weusten et al. represents a solid step in the field of
risk estimation, extending the incidence per window period model in a sub-
stantial and clear manner. The semi-mechanistic nature of the model balances
pragmatic fitting to available data with available evidence regarding the details
of acute HIV infections.
Characterising the semi-mechanistic model
In order to establish a baseline for comparison, we present a brief characteri-
sation of how risk estimates using the semi-mechanistic model, proposed by
Weusten et al., depend on various parametric assumptions.

















Figure 3.3: Risk day equivalents per incident donor, calculated using the semi-
mechanistic model, for various values of ‘per-virion infectiousness’ pV, under
a screening algorithm consisting of a single Procleix Ultrio assay detecting HIV
in ID-NAT configuration [14, 32].
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Figure 3.4: Risk day equivalents per incident donor, when testing pooled (or
otherwise diluted) samples, according to the semi-mechanistic model. The ‘pool
size/dilution factor’ may be thought of equivalently as the number of samples
in a test pool, or as a reduction of the test’s analytical sensitivity achieved by
multiplying x50 and x95 by a factor equal to the pool size (see equations in pre-
vious section). The y-axis shows window period ’risk-day equivalents’ under
a screening algorithm consisting of a single Proxleix Ultrio assay detecting HIV
in ID-NAT configuration [14, 32]. Decreasing sensitivity or increasing pool size
causes diminishing increases in residual risk - e.g. switching from a pool size of
8 to a pool size of 16 would cause a larger increase in risk than switching from
a pool size of 16 to a pool size of 32.
In the semi-mechanistic model, multiplying the analytical sensitivities (i.e. x50
and x95) of the test by some factor is equivalent to multiplying the pool size by
the same factor. This is because the detection probability depends on the vi-
ral load only in one term, in which it is divided by x50. In the only other term
containing x50 or x95, these values are divided by one another. Therefore, mul-
tiplying x50 and x95 by some factor is equivalent to dividing (through dilution)
the viral load by the same factor before putting it into the test well.
We also calculate the delay between 50% infectiousness and 50% detectability
using various values of per-virion infectiousness (pv) for the purpose of com-
parison with other models (Figure 3.6). Notice that the semi-mechanistic model
predicts some residual risk even when the mean delay between infectiousness
and detectability is zero or negative (when the standard window period calcu-
lations, e.g. from the IWP model, would predict zero risk). For larger values of
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Figure 3.5: Risk estimates in the semi-mechanistic model vary linearly with
viral doubling time (slope = 3.4). This occurs because the only model term in
which time appears explicitly is divided by the doubling time, and the output
of the model is an integral over time. Figure shows window period risk-day
equivalents under a screening algorithm consisting of a single Procleix Ultrio
assay detecting HIV in ID-NAT configuration [14, 32].
pV however the models come into closer agreement.














Mean delay between 
 50% infectious and 50% detectable
Figure 3.6: Risk day equivalents per incident donor, and mean delay between
50% infectiousness and 50% non-detectability, versus per-virion infectiousness
according to the semi-mechanistic model. Figure shows window period risk-
day equivalents under a screening algorithm consisting of a single Procleix Ul-
trio assay detecting HIV in ID-NAT configuration [14, 32].
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Our implementation of the model described by Weusten et al. resulted in suc-
cessful replication of their main results for ‘no re-test’ HIV screening (Table 3 in
[14]) using the parameters they reported. We did however find one apparent er-
ror: it appears that the original authors mistakenly substituted into equation 3.4
the viral concentration in units of ‘copies per ml’ rather than in units of ‘copies
per aliquot of volume used in the test’. According to the package insert for the
Procleix Ultrio assay [83], the standard volume of test material to be aliquoted
is 500µl = 0.5 ml. This means that concentration values in copies/ml must be
halved before substitution. We replicated the authors’ results by directly sub-
stituting the concentration, in copies/ml, into both equations 3.3 and 3.4 (i.e.
using the incorrect units for equation 3.4). The use of incorrect units when sub-
stituting into equation 3.4 is equivalent to reducing the sensitivity (or increasing
the pool size) by a factor of two. Accordingly we calculate, using the same pa-
rameters as reported by Weusten et al. (but corrected for the volume of material
aliquoted), a WP risk-days equivalent under ID-NAT of 3.74 days (which is the
same value as Weusten et al. reported for minipool testing with a pool size of
two), rather than the 2.93 days calculated by Weusten et al. [14].
In addition, it is not clear, based on the references given by Weusten et al.,
where the estimates used for x50 and x95 are obtained (they use x50 = 2.7 and
x95 = 18.4 copies/ml). The package insert for Procleix Ultrio HIV-1 (the HIV as-
say referenced by Weusten et al. [14]) claims 50% and 95% limits of detection of
13.9 copies/ml and 37.7 copies/ml respectively. The two independent studies
examining the performance of Procleix Ultrio for detecting HIV (as well as HBV
and HCV), which Weusten et al. cite as their sources, report central estimates for
x50 and x95 of 5.31 IU/ml ≈ 3.19 copies/ml and 32.9 IU/ml ≈ 19.74 copies/ml
[85], and 6.1 IU/ml ≈ 3.66 copies/ml and 42.2 IU/ml ≈ 25.3 copies/ml. Sev-
eral other values are also reported (reflecting estimates made other panels of
preserved samples), but none of these match up with the values reported by
Weusten et al.
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Donation timing
After incidence, which is relatively straightforward to measure, another ‘ingre-
dient’ to the incidence per window period model and its derivatives (including
those described in this work) is the effect of infectious exposure on donors’ rates
of donation [20, 2]. The standard assumption has remained that donation rates
are constant; in particular, that donation rates are constant relative to infectious
exposure [35]. However, the fact that antibody testing eliminates all but a small
window of infection risk for each donor who donates following infectious ex-
posure means that a even a short period of self-deferral practiced by a poten-
tial donor (following their infectious exposure) would drastically reduce their
contribution to the overall risk faced by transfusion recipients. It is reasonable
to think that many repeat, seroconverting donors (who regularly pass the pre-
donation screening questionnaire) may be infected due to periods of unusually
risky exposure (rather than generally risky lifestyles), which might lead them
to self-defer (or be deferred during questionnaire/interview screening) in the
periods during which they would contribute most to the overall risk [2].
Our exploration thus far suggests two possible sources of risk over-estimation:
‘conservative’ assumptions regarding per-virion infectiousness, and the assump-
tion that donation timing is unaffected by risky exposure (so that incident donors
are equally likely to donate at any time point relative to infectious exposure).
Two mechanisms have been suggested through which donation rates might be
modified by risky exposure. The first explanation posits that non-remunerated
voluntary donors are generally well-meaning people, and as such are likely to
‘self-defer’11 from donating blood after periods of risky exposure (for example,
after having unprotected sex with new partners). The second explanation is that
the desire to access a free, high quality HIV test following periods of risky ex-
posure leads people to present themselves for donation, and attempt to pass the
pre-donation screening, at the time when they present the highest level of risk
to potential transfusion recipients [86]. A number of published works (doubt-
less alongside many unpublished analyses) have attempted to identify potential
11‘Self-deferral’ in this contexts includes any mechanism that would prevent a potential
donor from actually giving blood, including answering survey questions honestly in such a
way that they are deferred from donation, as well as simply choosing not to attend a blood
donation opportunity.
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deviations from constant donation rates among seroconverting donors, but the
available evidence to date appears to support the idea that donation timing is
not affected by high-risk exposures [86, 36].
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Chapter 4
A general framework for estimating
transmission risk
The general modelling framework introduced in Chapter 2 encompasses pre-
viously described methods, such as those in the IWP and the semi-mechanistic
model, for calculating the effective size of the ‘infectious viraemic window pe-
riod’ [20, 14]. In this section we describe some implementations of the general
modelling framework. Focusing on the notion of variability among donors, re-
cipients, viral strains, conditions to which donated blood is exposed, and trans-
fusion procedures, we apply the general modelling framework to calculate the
effective size of the ‘infectious viraemic window period’. Following the lan-
guage of Weusten et al., we refer to this quantity, which has units of ‘days’, as
the ‘risk per incident donor’, measured in ‘risk-day equivalents’1. The specific
assumptions used in the present work are described and a code base is intro-
duced for implementing flexible models of test performance.
4.1 Intra- and inter-subject variability of
infectiousness and detection probability
Many details of ‘the truth’ behind the assumptions in TTI risk models are des-
tined to remain fairly uncertain over the foreseeable future. Residual risk for
1‘Overall’ risk might instinctively be thought of as the per-transfusion risk to the recipient -
this is directly proportional to the quantity which we refer to as ‘overall risk’.
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TTI’s depends on a combination of biology, epidemiological and social context,
and test properties [2]. Nonetheless, we wish to establish the contexts in which
certain properties of the general model have a significant impact on risk esti-
mates. To begin, we review our general model’s assumptions in slightly more
detail.
Firstly, at the time of a hypothetical subject’s infectious exposure (also referred
to as the ‘time of infection’), the probability of a test algorithm detecting the in-
fection (the ‘detectability’ of the infection under the test algorithm) is zero [16].
After some time has elapsed, the probability of detection for the subject (as well
as the average probability across all hypothetical subjects with the same time
of infectious exposure) will increase, following the increase in target biomarker
levels, until it is reaches one2 [16]. In other words, the probability that the al-
gorithm will fail to detect the new infection will, after some time has elapsed,
decrease from one to zero (see Figure 4.1).
Similarly, at the time of infectious exposure, a subject’s blood has effectively
zero probability of causing an infection if it is transfused. This is considered
reasonable because the initial phases of HIV infection are thought to occur in
a localised fashion, with no viable virions or infected cells circulating in the
bloodstream3 [19, 88, 40]. Furthermore, it is widely believed that the infectious-
ness, via transfusion, of a subject’s blood - specifically, one unit of red blood cell
(RBC) component - increases during initial infection until it approaches one (see
Figure 4.2 below) [89, 71]. The true maximum infectiousness of HIV-infected
blood is difficult to estimate and may depend on a variety of factors includ-
ing the type of blood product being transfused, the handling of blood products
(e.g. centrifuging, cooling/warming and transportation) between donation and
transfusion, and the particular characteristics of the virus, donor and recipient,
but evidence from the early stages of the HIV pandemic suggest that it has a
mean of at least 95% [71]. In this work it is assumed that infectiousness may
come arbitrarily close to one, though this assumption could be easily relaxed.
The trend in transfusion risk modelling has been to ‘conservatively’ estimate
2The diagnostic sensitivities reported for approved screening tests are typically very close
to 1 [87, 37].
3A recently infected transfusion recipient might in theory be an exception to this, but they
would not be donating blood immediately after transfusion.
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Figure 4.1: The probability that a subject who recently experienced an infectious
exposure will test negative changes with time. In this figure, two individuals
have been assigned characteristic delays to ‘detectability’ (and corresponding
‘non-detection probability’). The sigmoidal piece of each curve illustrates how
noisy the measurement is as they approach detectability (i.e. the noisiness in the
process of going from non-detectable to detectable), while the horizontal posi-
tion reflects the delay (e.g. to 50% detectability). The two hypothetical subjects
pictured differ only in their delays, but in general different individuals would
also have differently shaped transitions from non-detectable to detectable.
that every virion is completely infectious, and that the probability of a recip-
ient being infected is equal to the probability that the blood product they re-
ceive contains at least one virion (an exception being the work of Weusten et
al.) [14, 21]. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the authors of the IWP recognised that
they were estimating the risk of a ‘potentially infectious’ (rather than definitely
infectious) donation entering the blood supply. In that sense, this work (and the
work of Weusten et al.), is estimating a new quantity - the risk of infection per
incident donor - rather than the old ‘risk of potentially infectious blood’.
The risk faced by each recipient of blood from a hypothetical donor who do-
nates following infectious exposure is given by the product of the donor’s time-
varying ‘infectiousness’ and ‘non-detection probability’ (see Figure 4.3 below).
The final characteristic of the general model is that of donor, virus and re-
cipient variability. Biological systems are full of variability, both random (or
unexplained) and structured. The immune systems of transfusion recipients,
for example, are likely to vary widely, due in part to long term factors such
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Figure 4.2: The infectiousness of blood products, from a donor who has recently
experienced infectious exposure, changes with time. In this figure, two individ-
uals have been assigned characteristic delays to maximal infectiousness (in this
case maximal infectiousness equals 1). The sigmoidal piece of each curve il-
lustrates the noisiness in the process of going from non-infectious to infectious,
while the horizontal position reflects the delay. The two hypothetical subjects
pictured differ only in their delays, but in general different individuals would
also have differently shaped transitions from non-infectious to maximally infec-
tious.
as age and genetics, as well as acute factors (e.g. factors related to the recipi-
ent’s need for a transfusion) [27]; some recipients may need transfusions due to
conditions which affect the immune system drastically, while for others the im-
mune system is functioning as usual. Pathogens too vary - HIV is renowned for
its genetic variability [44]. For example, natural selection often enforces trade-
offs between pathogen virulence and transmission opportunities allowed by
host longevity. For HIV in particular, there is evidence to suggest that founder
strains - the genetic variants which seed infections - are much less successful at
reproducing within hosts, so that once infections are well-established, the most
prevalent strains are much less effective than the founder in terms of between-
host transmission [90, 91, 92]. This in turn suggests that there might be corre-
lation between factors influencing within-host reproduction and factors influ-
encing between-host transmission (i.e. a correlation between growth rate and
infectiousness).
There is probably at least some positive correlation between the times (fol-
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Figure 4.3: The risk that donated blood from a recently-infected subject will both
test negative, and cause an infection in a hypothetical recipient, changes with
time. In this figure, two individuals have been assigned characteristic delays to
detectability and maximal infectiousness. The likelihood of simultaneous non-
detection and subsequent transmission, for each point in time, is given by the
product of the individual likelihoods. The two hypothetical subjects pictured
differ only in their delays, but in general different individuals would also have
differently shaped transitions from non-infectious to maximally infectious and
non-detectable to maximally detectable.
lowing infectious exposure) at which subjects begin to be detectable on a cer-
tain assay, and the times at which they begin to be infectious [16]. For example,
those who become detectable early (e.g. reaching 50% detectability early rela-
tive to a population average) on a particular NAT assay are likely to reach 50%
infectiousness earlier than average, since pathogen levels are a key determinant
of infectiousness, and NAT assays measure the pathogen directly [18]. On the
other hand, one might expect slightly weaker (though still positive) correlation
between the timing of 50% detectability on an antibody assay and the timing
of 50% infectiousness. Random factors, such as the quantity of plasma left in
a particular unit of RBC component after fractionation or the exact volume of
sample material aliquoted into a test well, will also tend to reduce the strength
of correlation. Given the multitude of difficult-to-observe factors which might
effect the strength and direction of correlation, we explore the effects that dif-
ferent strengths and directions of correlation have on the overall residual risk.
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Modern HIV tests used for transfusion screening achieve for the most part4 ex-
tremely high diagnostic sensitivity levels and, when used in sensitivity-prioritising
multi-test screening algorithms [37, 2], eliminate virtually all the risk from long-
infected donors5. In other words, the single significant source of TT-HIV risk, in
settings following recommended blood safety procedures, is recently-infected
donors whose test samples contain inadequate biomarker levels for reliable de-
tection (i.e. who would be described as being in the test algorithm’s window
period) [20, 2].
4.2 Generic residual risk model specification
Time-varying infectiousness and detectability curves are represented using cu-
mulative Weibull distributions. Specifically, the likelihood of a positive test re-
sult at time t after infectious exposure is given by:




) if t > ε,
where Sensdiag is the diagnostic sensitivity of the test in question (henceforth
assumed to be 1), ε is the delay between exposure and the first increase in the
probability of testing positive6, k is the ‘shape’ parameter, and γ is the ‘scale’
parameter. The Weibull distribution is one of a handful of commonly used func-
tions for modelling within-host disease dynamics with few parameters or little
information regarding the mechanism of disease [94, 95]. In line with the aims
of this work, the cumulative Weibull distribution is flexible, satisfies the cri-
teria described in Section 4.1 for infectiousness and detectability (transitioning
smoothly from some baseline value to some maximum value) and has relatively
few parameters (two, excluding positional shift) [96, 97, 22].
4Cost constraints may limit the screening algorithm to tests with lower-than-recommended
sensitivities due to inadequate laboratory controls and/or the use of rapid diagnostic tests.
5A potential exception is infected donors on long-term ART treatment - e.g. see [93, 50].
6The probability of testing positive when t <= ε is equal to the diagnostic specificity of the
test in question.
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Delay between 5% and 95% on a Weibull curve
‘Individual’ curves - that is, the curves representing hypothetical subjects - are
parameterised such that they align with available data regarding the time taken
to transition from non-detectable to highly-detectable, and from non-infectious
to highly infectious7. If an individual has a 5% probability of testing positive at
time t = a, 95% probability of testing positive at time t = b, and we specify the









Fiebieg et al. report ‘highly consistent’ patterns of test results in serial plasma
donations which had a median of 4-day intervals (and which were limited to
twice weekly). In other words, the probability of obtaining a positive test result
for a sample, along with a negative test result for the sample that was collected
the following week from the same individual, was very low [13]. We parame-
terise the individual Weibull curves such that their delay from 5% to 95% takes
3.4 days. We set k = 2 in order to obtain a reasonable shape (see individual
curves in Figure 2.1) and solve numerically to obtain γ = 1.73.
Delays from infectious exposure until 50% detectability and infectiousness are
assumed to be normally distributed. The timescale (i.e. the maximum and min-
imum time values for which the area under the ‘risk’ curve is calculated) of cal-
culations is made sufficiently large to ensure that the region of interest - where
risk is nonzero - is fully accounted for.
The semi-mechanistic model is extended by allowing for inter-subject vari-
ability in viral doubling times and in (subject-level) mean per-virion infectious-
ness values. To this end, inter-subject variability is generated using truncated
normal distributions. Truncation is necessary in order to impose reasonable
bounds, e.g. doubling time must be positive. However, truncation shifts the
distributional means and standard deviations from the parent (non-truncated)
distributions. Since it is not possible to generate truncated normal distributions
7The general model and supporting code base support variability in all of the key model
parameters, including the rate of transition from undetectable to highly-detectable. We focus
on one type of variability here, since we believe this captures the key concepts at play and is
more straightforward to analyse.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of the generalised approach to estimating the residual
risk posed by an incident donor. Thin green curves show individual-level tran-
sitions from non-infectious to infectious, while the thick green curve shows the
mean infectiousness at a given time following infectious exposure. Similarly,
the thin orange curves show individual-level nondetection probabilities, while
the thick orange curve shows the mean nondetection probability. σinf is the
standard deviation of individual delays between exposure and becoming 50%
infectious, while σdet is the standard deviation of delays between exposure and
becoming 50% detectable. The mean curves are generated from denser sam-
ples of underlying (i.e. not plotted) individual curves. The dashed grey line
indicates the probability that the donated material will both test negative and
cause an infection if transfused. The grey shaded area indicates the ‘area’ of
risk (measured in days) posed, on average, by an incident donor.
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with specified means and standard deviations through purely analytical meth-
ods, we use the R function multisolve (from the rootsolve package) to find
pre-truncation parameters which lead to the desired post-truncation properties
[98].
In both the generic model and the extended semi-mechanistic model, parame-
ters are generated through inverse transform sampling of the applicable normal
and truncated normal distributions. As well as being much more computation-
ally efficient than pseudo-random sampling, and being easier to reproduce on
other platforms, inverse transform sampling has the advantage of reducing the
need to check, when using non-truncated normal distributions, for extreme out-
liers which could influence results.
Correlation in the general model is implemented according to the order in
which subjects achieve 50% detectability and infectiousness. In other words,
perfect positive correlation implies that subjects who become infectious the ear-
liest (following exposure) also become detectable the earliest; if variability in in-
fectiousness and detectability are identical, perfect positive correlation implies
that every donor has the same delay between being 50% infectious and 50%
detectable (differing only in their delays between infectious exposure and 50%
infectiousness/detectability). Perfect negative correlation implies that the ‘first’
donors to become infectious (i.e. with the shortest delay between exposure and
50% infectiousness) are the last to become detectable (thus likely contributing
a large amount to the overall risk) while the last donors to become infectious
are the first to become detectable (and thus contribute a smaller amount to the
overall risk than donors with early onset of infectiousness and late onset of de-
tectability).
Different choices for how to parameterise correlation involve trade-offs in
terms of presenting the results of the model. Parameterising correlation ac-
cording to the magnitudes of delay times (or differences in delay times from
the mean delay) creates a dependency between the levels of inter-subject vari-
ability and the overall strength of correlation. Normalising the expressions to
remove dependency on other model parameters is equivalent to implementing
correlation based on parameter order. Parameterising correlation according to
the order of parameter values (e.g. delay to detectability) allows numerical ac-
cess to the full dynamic range of the questions at hand, without depending on
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detailed assumptions regarding the underlying parameters.
In the extensions of the semi-mechanistic model described here, correlation is
implemented in terms of the order of the underlying parameters. Perfect pos-
itive correlation means that the subjects with the shortest viral doubling time
λ have the smallest value of per-virion infectiousness. Perfect negative correla-
tion means that subjects with the shortest doubling time have the highest value
of per-virion infectiousness. Correlation can be ‘dialed’ continuously between
‘perfect positive’, ‘no correlation’ and ‘perfect negative’.
Positive correlation is implemented by constructing a ‘correlation matrix’ in
which each row/column position is assigned a value by calculating the proba-
bility density, in a normal distribution with zero mean, of the difference between
the row and column number. The standard deviation of the normal distribution
used determines the strength of correlation. Each matrix is normalised so that
its elements sum to one. Matrices for generating negative correlation are con-
structed by reversing the column indices from the ‘positive correlation’ matrix.
‘Correlated’ risk estimates are made by calculating the ‘individual-level’ risk as-
sociated with every combination of parameter values (e.g. delays). The estimate
for the total number of risk-day equivalents is then calculated as the weighted
sum of ‘individual-level’ risk estimates. The weight of each estimate is given by
the element in the corresponding correlation matrix with row number equal to
the index of the first parameter and column number equal to the index of the
second parameter.
4.3 Code base: a toolbox
Following infectious exposure, people may exhibit a variety of biomarker growth
curves, undergo different types and numbers of tests at different times, and
have varying levels of infectiousness over time. Code was developed for mod-
elling the processes which underlie issues such as residual risk and infection
dating. The code base allows models to be compared with the explicit knowl-
edge of the assumptions encoded within them, and explore a variety of assump-
tions using one coherent and flexible tool.
The modelling framework is implemented in the R programming language
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[99], using a number of publicly available packages. R was chosen for its range
of statistical libraries, free availability, flexibility, and popularity among epi-
demiological and public health researchers (i.e. the intended user base for this
project). Code was developed which may be used to explore the dynamics of
systems which depend on test performance characteristics and biomarker dy-
namics, such as the residual risk of TTI’s in screened blood products. While
implementations chosen for the results presented in this work are necessarily
limited by space and time, a number of extensions can be naturally incorpo-
rated into the analyses using the existing code. The code is also structured such
that adding additional functionality would be relatively straightforward. The
development of a flexible (may be re-purposed) and robust (avoids generating
spurious results) code base required thoughtful design choices along with vari-
ous checks and balances. The full code base can be found in a publicly available
repository at: github.com/JemLukeBingham/biomarkers; snippets of code are
shown in the rest of this chapter. See the Readme.md file in the repository for an
overview of the repository structure.
The desired flexibility means users must be able to:
1. Specify the nature of the curves defining individual/mean biomarker lev-
els, infectiousness, and/or detectability.
2. Specify the extent of variability in whichever parameters they choose, as
well as the distributional assumptions for implementing variability.
3. Calculate the products of individual and/or mean-level curves.
4. Vary the strength of correlation between combinations of parameter val-
ues for parameters with variability (e.g. in different curves).
5. Calculate integrals of (areas under) the resultant product curves or related
functions (e.g. calculating the expectation value of a posterior likelihood
for a point-estimate of infection date).
Cumulative Weibull distributions were used to describe individual-level in-
fectiousness and detectability. Cumulative Weibull distributions are usually
parameterised from where they become non-zero; while this is maintained as
an option, it is convenient to be able to specify where each curve reaches 50%,
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since diagnostic delays and infectiousness estimates are often parameterised
according to 50% detectability and 50% infectiousness. In order to generate cu-
mulative Weibull distributions (‘Weibull curves’) with 50% values at specified
locations, the position of each curve must be shifted by γ× k
√
− ln(0.5). Func-
tions are defined for generating a Weibull curve and shifting a curve such that
the 50% value lies at a desired location; these are then wrapped these together
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The function (‘individual_sensitivity_weibul’) can then be called with vectors
of scale and/or shape and/or delay parameters. Provided the vectors are the
same length, the function will (with R’s natural vectorisation) produce curves
over the ‘times’ vector for each of the parameters in the vectors. This method
is faster and more elegant than simply writing a ‘for’ loop in R to calculate
all of the individual-level curves. It also allows the user to specify whichever
parameter combinations they choose, without being tied to particular methods
for simulating variability.
Using the existing code, variability may be simulated using either inverse
transform sampling or pseudo-random sampling (with R’s built-in random num-
ber generators), from normal distributions or truncated normal distributions.
Truncation avoids spurious outputs resulting from unrealistic individual-level
parameter values (such as ‘individual-level’ curves with substantial probabili-
ties of testing positive at the time of infectious exposure, or an ‘individual’ with
a negative per-virion infectiousness value). It also makes results more robust
to arbitrary choices such as the number of individual-level curves to simulate
when using inverse transform sampling (which causes the range of parameter
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In order to be able to specify the realised mean of a truncated normal distribu-
tion with non-symmetric truncation (relative to the pre-truncation mean), code
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stop(" You won't be able to find a truncated
normal with the combination of mean and max/min

















Calculating the product of two curves at each time point (representing joint
likelihoods) is fairly straightforward in R; we include a wrapper function generateProductCurve
to make the code more readable.
Correlation is implemented by calculating the risk resulting from each pair
of parameters (or parameter combinations), then weighting the sum of these
individual-level risks according to the entries in a ‘correlation matrix’. The cor-
relation matrix may be specified arbitrarily, so long as it is normalised (its en-
tries sum to 1) and has the same number of rows and columns as the number of
values for each variable parameter. Code is currently available for generating
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correlation matrices according to the order of parameter values, or according to
differences between individual parameter values and the mean parameter val-
ues. In the simpler case (where correlation is generated according to order) the
user must supply the number of values for each parameter and a measure of the
strength of correlation. The function which generates the correlation matrices
checks some basic features of the input, then outputs a normalised matrix of
weights. Negative correlation is achieved by reversing the order of the rows or














print(" Whoah! This thing wasn't built to handle perfect
correlation of different-size event-time vectors.






for (i in 1:nrow(correlationMatrix)){
for (j in 1:ncol(correlationMatrix)){
correlationMatrix[i,j] <- dnorm(abs((eventTimes1[i]-mean1) /
sd1 - (eventTimes2[j]-mean2)/sd2),
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for (i in 1:nrow(correlationMatrix)){














ticktype = " detailed" ,
expand = 0.5,
shade = .2)
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for (i in 1:nrow(correlationMatrix)){











ticktype = " detailed" ,
expand = 0.5,
shade = .2,
xlab = " Index of parameter 1" ,
ylab = " Index of parameter 2" ,
zlab = " " )
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Single-variable definite integrals in R are calculated using the AUC (area under
the curve) function from the DescTools package [100]:
naive_risk = AUC(times,naive_likelihood).
Functions were created to calculate and combine the constituent components
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# defaults to the values used by Weusten et al (2011),
# i.e. the procleix Ultrio essay HIV-1; IDNAT
times = seq(0,maxTime,1/detail)




viralLoads2 = viralLoads / poolSize
if(volume_correction==TRUE){viralLoads2 = viralLoads2 / 2}
nondetectionProbability = calc_p_nondetect(VL = viralLoads2,
X50 = X50,
X95 = X95,
Z = qnorm (0.95))




print(" nondetection probability too






xlab = " Time (days)" ,
ylab= " Likelihood" ,type=' l' )
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Risk estimates from the base semi-mechanistic model may be calculated using
a single line of code.
calc_Weusten_risk(dblT = 0.85, pV = 0.217, poolSize = 2)
In addition, users must be confident that the outputs of the simulations are
caused by the assumptions they encoded, rather than by anomalies in the un-
derlying code. For example, in our simulations infectiousness and detectability
levels at the earliest/latest time points must not be significantly different from
to their maximal or minimal values, to ensure that the risk is not underestimated
as a result of simply not including some of the risk-time in the calculation. Users
must also be confident that the results of simulations are reproducible. In order
to address these challenges we include various checks within the key functions,
as well as snippets of commented-out code for testing the behaviour of individ-
ual functions. Some functions, including the functions for creating correlation
matrices, and the function for calculating risk using the base semi-mechanistic
model (i.e. as described by Weusten et al. [14]), include an option to ‘illustrate’
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Figure 4.5: Left panel: Optional illustration produced by the
calc_Weusten_Risk function, showing the infectiousness and detectability
of a blood product (one unit of RBC component) from a hypothetical donor,
as functions of time since the onset of exponential viral growth. Right panel:
Optional illustration produced by the get_Cor_Matrix_Order function. z-axis
values represent the (normalised) weights applied to each pair of parameter
values, when weighted sums of individual contributions to the average risk are
calculated. x-axis and y-axis values represent indices which specify positions
in two vectors of parameter values (e.g. a vector of per-virion infectiousness
values and and a vector of viral doubling times). The relative probability of a
recently-infected hypothetical donor exhibiting a combination of, for example,
the third value in the vector of per-virion infectiousness values, and the seventh
value in the vector of viral doubling times, will be given by the z-axis value at
x = 3, y = 7.
Code structure
The code base is structured as follows: all functions as well as default param-
eter values (including estimated parameters such as mean viral doubling time
as well as parameters such as plot colour schemes) are defined in separate files
(‘functions.R’ and ‘parameters.R’). Scripts for generating and displaying spe-
cific results are created independently and begin by running the same function
and parameter scripts. Following many function definitions are brief tests for
the functions; currently these must be manually checked by un-commenting
the relevant lines and checking the output. Next to parameter definitions are
(where applicable) digital object identifiers (DOIs), paper titles, and/or author
names for the sources of the parameter estimates.
We chose to make names informative and naturally readable, rather than brief.
Functions are named using verbs while outputs and parameters are named us-
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ing nouns. The use of camelCase versus separating ‘words’ in names using
underscores is still inconsistent, though newer code uses underscores.
Results are generated independently for each model. Each set of results and
accompanying figures is generated in a single script. The overall workflow is:
1. Run scripts to define functions and default parameters.
2. Define the parameters for implementing variability (e.g. number of curves
to use in each simulation, length of simulations, etc), and overwrite de-
fault parameters for individual curves if desired.
3. Create matrices with which to generate correlation between chosen pa-
rameters.
4. Create distributed parameter values. This defines the size of the results;
more distributed values means more potential combinations.
5. For each combination of parameter values and correlation levels calculate
risk.
The code base described here constituted a use-able tool which can be adapted
with relative ease to address a wide range of questions related to diagnostic test
performance.
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Results: calculating the effective size
of the window period
Comparing results between models
The amount of TT-HIV risk posed by a hypothetical incident donor - analo-
gous to the window period, occurring in units of days, and referred to as ‘risk
days per incident donor’ or simply ‘risk per incident donor’ - is calculated us-
ing both the generic model and the extended semi-mechanistic model. Results
are compared to equivalent estimates using methods from the IWP model (i.e.
the mean delay between infectiousness and detectability) and the original semi-
mechanistic model [20, 14]. The number of ‘risk-day equivalents’ posed by an
incident donor is directly proportional (once donor incidence is included) to
the number of resultant infections among recipients, subject to the assumption
that donation rates are unaffected by infectious exposure1. Results are reported
using the summary metric of ‘risk-day equivalents’, which captures the interac-
tion of the biology of transmission with the biology and technology of detectable
infection.
1To be precise, the total risk is proportional to the risk per incident donor in risk-day equiva-
lents when the incidence rates are uniform and equal during the period over which incidence is
measured, and the period during which the risk is substantially different from zero. In the new
IWP for example, one can relax the assumption of fully uniform donation rates, and assume
only that donation rates are uniform between the time of infectious exposure and antibody
conversion.
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5.1 Risk estimates using the generic model
The number of risk-day equivalents per incident donor calculated using the
generic model is always larger than (or equal to) the mean delay between 50%
infectiousness and 50% detectability (also referred to simply as the ‘mean de-
lay’) (Figures 5.1 - 5.3).
The relative difference between the generic model and the mean delay is larger
when the mean delay is ‘near’ to zero, while the generic model predicts risk
close to the mean delay when the magnitude of the mean delay is large. The
scale at which the risk under the generic model differs substantially from the
mean delay depends on the magnitude of inter-subject variability. The bottom
panel of Figure 5.1 shows results from the generic model with relatively large
inter-subject variability while the top panel shows results with lower levels of
inter-subject variability.
Correlation affects risk estimates substantially. Perfect positive correlation re-
sults in risk estimates near to the mean delay, differing meaningfully (in relative
terms) only when the mean delay becomes small or negative. Perfect nega-
tive correlation generates larger risk estimates than perfect positive correlation
for equivalent levels of inter-subject variability and mean delays. Changing
the level of correlation approximately continuously from positive to negative
causes risk estimates to increase approximately continuously (not plotted), and
estimates assuming imperfect correlation lie between estimates made using per-
fect positive and estimates made using perfect negative correlation.
Each risk estimate with inter-subject variability is a weighted sum of risks
represented by pairs of ‘individual-level’ curves. Each pair of individual-level
curves, made up of one ‘infectiousness’ curve and one ‘non-detection proba-
bility’ curve, has an associated ‘delay’ (i.e. between the times at which the
‘individual-level’ infectiousness and detectability curves reach 50%).
Correlation in this model means assigning probabilities to pairs of individual-
level curves. With no correlation, all weights are equal - i.e. every possible pair
of individual-level infectiousness and nondetectability curves is equally likely.
In the generic model with perfect positive correlation and equal levels of inter-
subject variability (in the timing of infectiousness/detectability), the contribu-
tion to the total risk is the same for every ‘individual-level’ pair of curves. Be-
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Figure 5.1: Risk per incident donor (measured in risk-day equivalents) in the
implemented version of the general model, with relatively high inter-subject
variability in the timing of infectiousness and detectability (σ1 = σ2 = 13 days.
Risk estimates depend strongly on the assumed degree of correlation between
the times at which subjects become infectious and detectable. The largest risk
estimates arise with perfect negative correlation - where subjects who become
infectious first become detectable last and vice versa - which maximises hetero-
geneity in the contribution of individual donors to overall risk, while perfect
positive correlation generates risk estimates which differ from the mean delay
only when the mean delay approaches zero. The effect of variability become
smaller when the mean delay becomes large.
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cause every ‘individual-level’ pair of curves is contributing the same amount
to risk, the risk estimate is determined purely by the shapes of the pairs of
individual-level curves (and the individual-level delays between infectiousness
and detectability, which are all equal to the mean delay). Since the cumulative
Weibull curves used are nearly symmetrical around their 50% values 2, when
the mean delay is long relative to the magnitude of intra-subject variability (i.e.
the duration of an individual curve’s transition from 0 to 1 or vice-versa) the
contribution to risk from a particular pair of curves is very close to the delay
between their 50% infectiousness and 50% detectability values.
The difference between the models is larger when the mean delay between
infectiousness and detectability is small, and when the correlation is weak or
negative. Results assuming perfect positive correlation between the times at
which subjects become infectious/detectable deviate from the mean delay only
when the mean delay is small (relative the the magnitude of inter-subject vari-
ability) or negative (in which case the actual amount of residual risk depends in
detail on the shapes of individual detectability and infectiousness curves). On
the other hand, when correlation is weak or negative the difference between the
models is larger when there is more inter-subject variability.
Furthering this approach, we calculate the overall risk using different levels of







with the resulting estimates (Figures 5.2 and
5.3). Interesting to note is that estimates under perfect positive correlation de-
crease with increasing inter-subject variability, up until the point where σ1 = σ2.
This occurs because both delays (from infectious exposure to infectiousness and
detectability respectively) are drawn from normal distributions, so that with
perfect correlation, inter-subject variability in delays from infectiousness to de-
tectability is minimised when both delay distributions have the same standard
deviation (which is equivalent to the model without variability, since variabil-
ity only in eclipse periods does not affect the results). However, as discussed
2The ‘true’ curves for a particular individual might not be symmetric - while this could be
easily incorporated into the model, the details of this non-symmetry are in general impossible
to parameterise, would have a substantial effect on model results (meaning that results would
be ‘baked-in’ to specific choices regarding individual infectiousness and detectability profiles,
rather than reflecting the general properties of intra- and inter- subject variability), and would
obscure comparisons with the ‘base’ model (i.e. the ‘window period’, as in Figure 3.1).
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in section 4.1, perfect positive correlation is highly unlikely to occur in reality,
and a modest departure from perfect positive correlation (black points in Fig-
ures 5.2 and 5.3) leads to qualitative agreement with Figure 5.1, where negative
correlation and increased variability imply higher levels of risk.












































































of inter-subject variability in delays to 50% infectious-
ness and detectability. σ1 is kept fixed at 10 days, while σ2 is varied between 0
(on left side of the plot) and 20 (at the right-most points). The mean delay is
kept fixed at 3 days. Calculations with perfect positive correlation are in gen-
eral lower than those with perfect negative correlation.
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of inter-subject variability. σ1 is kept fixed at 10
days, while σ2 is varied between 0 (on left side of the plot) and 20 (at the right-
most points). The mean delay is kept fixed at 12 days. Calculations with perfect
positive correlation are in general lower than those with perfect negative corre-
lation.
5.2 Risk estimates using the extended
semi-mechanistic model
Extending the semi-mechanistic model to incorporate inter-subject variability
in viral doubling time and per-virion infectiousness, the risk per incident donor
(in risk-day equivalents) is calculated and compared to results from the base
model. Calculations using the base model are made using the realised mean
parameter values from the extended model.
In all cases, we generate ‘individual’ per-virion infectiousness values (pV)
and viral doubling times (λ) from truncated normal distributions such that
0.0345 ≤ pV ≤ 0.9000 and 0.224 ≤ λ ≤ 2.275 days. The peaks of the distri-
butions are set to the mean values used by Weusten et al. (p̄V = 0.217 and
λ̄ = 0.85) [14]. Specifying the bounds of the distributions means that the re-
alised means and standard deviations cannot in general be specified exactly. At
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the limits of the achievable values, the distribution becomes flatter, and the pre-
truncation mean may shift out of the truncation range. In our case, the peak of
the distribution sits below the mean of the bounds of the distribution, and in-
creasing variability in either parameter results in an increased mean value. Due
to the linear relationship between doubling time and risk-days in the underly-
ing model, the effect of doubling-time variability may be isolated if we divide
risk estimates using the nuanced model (which are essentially weighted means
of the risks posed by each characteristic ‘subject’-level curve) by the realised
mean doubling time.
We begin by examining the effects of variability in doubling time and per-
virion infectiousness on the total risk-days per incident donor, for blood screened
by an algorithm consisting of a single Ultrio Plus test in ID-NAT configuration
(Figures 5.4 and 5.5).


































Figure 5.4: The effect of variability in per-virion infectiousness pV on risk per
incident donor, for RBC screened for HIV using a single Ultrio Plus assay with a
pool size of 2. Perfect positive correlation (i.e. subjects with the lowest pV have
the shortest doubling time λ, dotted line) generates risk estimates slightly larger
than the base model, while perfect negative correlation (dashed line) generates
smaller risk estimates. As expected, both these effects are stronger with more
variability. The mean pV value is kept constant at 0.217 [14].
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Figure 5.5: The effect of variability in viral doubling times λ on risk per incident
donor, for RBC screened for HIV using a single Ultrio Plus assay with a pool
size of 2. Perfect positive correlation (i.e. subjects with the lowest pV have the
shortest doubling time λ, dotted line) generates risk estimates slightly larger
than the base model, while perfect negative correlation (dashed line) generates
smaller risk estimates. As expected, both these effects are stronger with more
variability. The mean pV value is kept constant (within 0.1%) at 0.217 [14, 89]
Note that in Figure 5.5 the total risk estimates with/without variability do not
match up when σλ = 0. This is because σpV 6= 0 and the non-linear dependence
of total risk on pV means that the model estimate using the mean value is larger
that the mean of the ‘individual’ model estimates.
In line with our analysis of the general model, we wish to explore the effects
of reduced sensitivity - in this case analytic sensitivity, rather than explicitly
lengthened diagnostic delay - in the context of inter-subject variability.
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Figure 5.6: The effects of variability in viral doubling time, for different levels
of test sensitivity (or, equivalently, minipool size), under the extended semi-
mechanistic model. Each colour represents a factor-reduction in test sensitivity
(or increase in pool size) relative to a Procleix Ultrio assay testing for HIV in ID-
NAT configuration: 1 (maroon lines), 2 (green lines), 4 (purple lines), 8 (orange
lines), 16 (pink lines), 64 (grey lines), and 96 (black lines). ‘No variability’ (solid
lines) refers to the model without any variability at all, while the other lines
are generated with a fixed level of variability in per-virion infectiousness (sd
= 0.75) [14, 83].
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Figure 5.7: The effects of inter-subject variability in mean ‘per-virion infec-
tiousness’, for different levels of test sensitivity (or, equivalently, minipool size)
under the extended semi-mechanistic model. Each colour represents a factor-
reduction in test sensitivity (or increase in pool size) relative to a Procleix Ul-
trio assay testing for HIV in ID-NAT configuration: 1 (maroon lines), 4 (purple
lines), 16 (pink lines), and 96 (black lines). ‘No variability’ (solid lines) refers
to the model without any variability at all, while the other lines are generated
with a fixed level of variability in viral doubling time (sd = 1).
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Figure 5.8: The effects of inter-subject variability in viral doubling times, for dif-
ferent levels of test sensitivity/pool size, under the extended semi-mechanistic
model. All estimates assume a mean viral doubling time of 0.85 days, and a
mean ‘per-virion infectiousness’ of 0.217. Green lines show risk estimates as-
suming a standard deviation in viral doubling times of 1 day, while maroon
lines show risk estimates assuming a standard deviation in doubling time of
0.14 days. ‘No variability’ (solid lines) refers to the model without any variabil-
ity at all, while the other lines are generated with a fixed level of variability in
‘per-virion infeciousness’ (sd = 0.75).




Modelling the performance of tests for disease and infection has proved valu-
able in a number of fields, including blood safety and infection dating. In this
work, we have taken steps to develop a largely unexplored aspect of test per-
formance modelling: inter-subject variability coupled with time-varying test
performance. We have described a broad framework through which these fac-
tors may be considered, and subsequently applied this framework to relevant
questions in infection dating (see Grebe et al. [16] for details) and estimating
the residual risk of transfusion-transmitted HIV infections.
What are the implications of adding this particular type of nuance to resid-
ual risk estimation models? The main take-away from this work is, unsurpris-
ingly, that context determines how much nuance is appropriate to include in a
model. Nonetheless, the discovery of contexts where incorporating variability
both affects net risk estimates, and extends model usefulness to new domains,
demonstrates our primary message: whenever models are constructed which
include or rely on descriptions of test performance characteristics, researchers
should begin with generalised approaches. Only after the implications of nu-
anced descriptions have been explored may responsible decisions regarding
model structure be made. The generalised approach taken in this work pro-
vides a way of confirming whether/when a more nuanced model is called for,
and when one can confidently use a simpler model: the more general analysis
83
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leads one to a clearer understanding of the domains of validity of the simpler
analyses.
Context affects the results in different dimensions; firstly, the underlying model
structure naturally has a significant effect on risk estimates, and on the effects
of adding variability to the models. Lengthening the delay between infectious-
ness and detectability in the generic model reduces the impact of the nuanced
approach. Although this relationship is less straighforward in our extension
of the semi-mechanistic model1, a similar trend appears in the relative risks of
the model with/without inter-subject variability appears, whereby larger dif-
ferences between the more-simplistic base model and our extended model co-
incide with longer mean delays between the infectiousness and detectability.
Results from the generic model suggest that in domains with large delays be-
tween the onset of infectiousness and the onset of detectability, such as TT-HIV
risk estimation with antibody-only test algorithms, simplistic model assump-
tions prove well-justified, and results are not strongly affected by the addition
of nuance. When the delay between the onset of infectiousness and the onset of
detectability is small or negative, nuanced approaches lead to substantial dif-
ferences in results.
The dynamics of the semi-mechanistic model and accompanying extensions
should be viewed in the context of the underpinning viral growth model. For
example, the linear dependence of risk on the viral doubling time occurs be-
cause every time-dependent input to the model is in the form 2
t
λ . As such,
changing λ amounts to re-scaling the time axis. Since the total risk-days esti-
mate is an integral over all possible times, linearly re-scaling the time axis re-
scales the total risk-days estimate. Extrapolating to zero doubling time yields
the estimate of approximately zero risk, as expected (since zero doubling time
means the viral load would jump immediately from negligibly infectious to re-
liably detectable). Reducing the sensitivity of the screening algorithm (e.g. by
increasing the pool size) by factors of two corresponds to approximately arith-
metic increases in total risk estimates.
Inter-subject variation in per-virion infectiousness pV causes reduced risk es-
timates due to its non-linear relationship with individual-level risk. Since the
1For example, the level of inter-subject variability in per-virion infectiousness is tied to the
mean delay.
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total risk per seroconverting donor is essentially a weighted sum of ‘individual’
risks, the individual risks have the same dependency on pV as the total risk in
the base model. Changes in pV have a larger effect on total risk for small pV
values, so that the mean of two risk estimates with different pV values will be
skewed towards the risk estimate under the smaller value.
Positive correlation in the extended semi-mechanistic model means that small
viral doubling times imply small pV values - the safest possible combination,
since low doubling time causes a rapid transition from infectiousness to de-
tectability, while low pV means detectability is reached at lower infectiousness
levels. On the other hand, negative correlation implies that individuals with
large doubling times, who have a slow transitions between infectiousness and
detectability (and hence wider areas of risk), also become detectable at higher
levels of infectiousness. The unequal distribution of individual-level contribu-
tions to risk causes an increase in the total risk per seroconverting donor. Neg-
ative correlation, where the effects of doubling time and pV on risk counteract
one another at the individual level, results in the lowest risk estimates.
Whether positive or negative correlation is more realistic will depend on the
details of the pathogen, tests, and epidemiology (e.g. average time-since infec-
tion) in question and is likely in many cases to remain a mystery. Early dy-
namics of HIV infections have proven challenging to characterise [31, 43, 40].
The available evidence suggests that in established HIV infections, less infec-
tious viral strains are more abundant than the initial (more-infectious) founder
strain. On the other hand, it is believed that the early stages of adaptive immune
response target primarily non-founder strains of the virus [40].
Clearly the generalised framework may include models whose complexity
does not add value to end results, and in these circumstances simpler models
should be used. Indeed, the analyses presented in this work provide a way of
specifically confirming that simpler models are adequate, when applied in ap-
propriate contexts. However, as we have shown, there are circumstances where
a more nuanced approach does have an impact on results. Work which relies on
modelling the performance of diagnostic test characteristics should therefore be
conceptualised within the generalised framework; models may then be refined
according to which aspects of the generalised viewpoint are deemed useful.
This represents a non-trivial departure from the status-quo for the epidemio-
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logical modelling of test properties.
6.2 Directions for future work
A number of avenues exist through which the modelling approaches described
in this work might be extended. These include:
• exploring the implications of non-uniform timing of blood and/or tissue
donations relative to the timing of donor infectious exposure.
• modelling the residual risk of other transfusion-transmitted infections (e.g.
HCV, HBV, West Nile Virus, etc.), and extending incidence-estimation ap-
proaches such as those described by Grebe et al [16] to incorporate other
pathogens of interest.
• extending established residual risk estimation approaches to contexts in
which blood banking practices which fall short of WHO best-practice guide-
lines.
• modelling the implications of a pathogen-inactivation technology for resid-
ual risk of transfusion-transmitted infections.
Donation timing
If one wanted to explore the implications of non-homogeneous donation tim-
ing on residual risk, this would fit neatly into the general modelling framework
we have proposed, and would require only minor modifications to the existing
model and code. In essence, one could apply a time-dependent weight to the
individual-level risk curves capturing an assumption regarding the effect of in-
fectious exposure on donation rates. This would require few additional lines of
code to implement. More detailed assumptions would also be possible - for ex-
ample, the modification to donation rates following infectious exposure could
be correlated with other model parameters.
When making incidence estimates using passive surveillance systems, where
infected individuals must take action in order to be tested (whether directly
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seeking a test, or indirectly via seeking healthcare), non-uniformity in the prob-
ability of sample collection among infected individuals, relative to the timing of
infectious exposure, may have substantial impacts on results. The time-varying
probability of an infected individual having their sample collected may also
depend on non-homogeneous (in time, space, etc.) factors such as access to
healthcare and social perceptions regarding the disease in question. Similarly
to the issue of non-uniform donation timing, such scenarios could be neatly
incorporated into the modelling framework and code base described here.
Other TTI’s
Qualitatively realistic modelling of transfusion transmission risk from other
pathogens should follow a similar pattern to what has been described in this
work. The accuracy and precision with which models can be parameterised
varies drastically between diseases, depending generally on incidence, disease
life-cycle, and the extent of efforts to develop and parameterise tests. For dis-
eases such as HIV, where the details of the transition from non-detectable to
detectable (and non-infectious to infectious) are difficult to specify, despite sub-
stantial efforts in this direction, one could modify the shapes of the Weibul (or
similar) curves to fit the data which is available. For example, to estimate risk
from established (rather than early) infections, or to model a scenario in which
reliable tests are unavailable, one could modify the maximum detectability to
below 1 (and similarly for specificity).
The code base developed as part of this work allows many aspects of risk
modelling (and other applications) to be changed in a modular fashion - for
example, the functions used to describe detectability or infectiousness curves
could be adjusted or replaced without rewriting the rest of the code. In the-
ory all the components might be substituted, in which case the existing code
base could guide the user regarding which decisions must be made in order to
sensibly use the general framework described in Chapter 2. In such cases the
decisions themselves - e.g. how to model detectability, specifying mean delays
between various events, and implementing inter-subject variability - would be
made by the user.
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Blood banking beyond the WHO guidelines
In severely resource-constrained contexts, limited funds are available for the
screening of donor-derived material. In addition, the prevalence and incidence
of transfusion-transmitted infections are often significantly higher in resource-
limited settings [101, 102, 103]. Approved screening tests exist for a wide num-
ber of transfusion-transmissible infections, and ‘non-approved’ (by local or in-
ternational approval bodies) tests might also be used. Procedures for screening
donor-derived material in such contexts should ideally be such that the nega-
tive impact of TTI’s on public health is minimized - for example by maximising
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY) with a fixed per-donation budget, or opti-
mizing the QALY gained per currency spent. There is however little published
literature on the extent of formal optimization in any blood banking systems,
particularly in the developing world [80, 104, 105].
The risk of TTI’s in blood transfusion services following WHO best-practice
guidelines is low, even in high-prevalence, high-incidence settings [36, 2]. This
raises some questions. Are we focussing our scientific efforts in the right direc-
tion? What is the state of transfusion safety in low-resource settings, and how
do TTIs contribute to ongoing epidemics of established TTI’s (e.g. HBV, HBC,
HIV, syphilis, West-Nile virus) and outbreaks of emerging TTIs? What would
the cost-effectiveness of improving transfusion safety be, and how well do these
figures compete with existing public health spending in such settings?
The modelling approaches described in this work could be naturally extended
in order to explore residual risk implications of new screening algorithms, in-
corporating whatever level of data is available for characterising the tests in
question.
Modelling the introduction of a pathogen inactivation technology
Pathogen-inactivation methods, which reduce the levels of viable pathogens in
a sample, thus reducing transmission potential of potentially present pathogens,
have been developed for various blood products and are considered by some to
be the future of blood safety [106]. Due to the wide scope of the term and the
novelty of the technology, approval standards for pathogen inactivation meth-
ods are based on the somewhat arbitrary reduction factor of 106 [106]. Given
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that this is several orders of magnitude beyond the necessary reduction for
some TTI’s, it has been suggested that lower levels of pathogen inactivation
should be approved, for use in conjunction with NAT testing in some form. The
semi-mechanistic model and extensions could be applied to this scenario using
the existing code with well-chosen parametric inputs. For example, if it was as-
sumed that viable virions were uniformly inactivated by a factor of 103, but that
the RNA from these virions remained detectable, then the ‘pool size’ parameter
could be set to a value of 1103 . On the other hand, if experiments found variabil-
ity between donors in the extent of inactivation, this could be incorporated into
the distribution of per-virion infectiousness values [106, 107].
6.3 Conclusion
Modelling the performance of tests for disease and infection has proved valu-
able in a number of fields, including blood safety and infection dating. The ap-
proach taken in this work represents a conceptual shift from previous risk esti-
mation methods. We found that methods without variability work well in most
domains, but produce unrealistic results when the mean delay between de-
tectability and infectiousness is small or negative. Additionally, it was demon-
strated that, when inter- and intra-subject variability is considered, reducing
the diagnostic delay of test algorithms has diminishing returns, since some risk
remains even when the mean delay between infectiousness and detectability is
zero or negative. On the other hand, when samples are pooled for a NAT assay,
increasing pool sizes cause progressively smaller increases in the residual risk
values which they imply. The framework described in this work, and used to
generate these insights, with the accompanying code base, may be readily ap-
plied to fields such as infection dating (see Grebe et al. [16]), incidence estima-
tion, and estimation of the residual risk of transfusion-transmitted infections.
Characterising test performance in terms of diagnostic sensitivity and speci-
ficity as face-value numbers obscures dynamics which can add value to the way
both scientists and clinicians conceptualise test performance. The context in
which test performance is considered determines how much detail is appropri-
ate to include in a model, and the implications of nuanced approaches encom-
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passed by the generalised framework should be explored in order to make re-
sponsible decisions about modelling efforts which rely on realistic descriptions
of test performance.
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